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INTRODUCTION 
In the last thirty years, the use of standby letters of credit' in contracts between 
corporations in industrialized nations and governments in Third World countries has 
increased significantly. One of its most common new uses is as a guarantee by the seller 
that he will fully perform his obligations under the contract. There have also been many 
other uses developed for standby letters of credit in other business transactions.2 Standby 
letters of credit are different in both function and form from traditional letters of credit 
which are used to facilitate payment for goods in international transactions.3 Yet, despite 
the dramatic differences between traditional letters of credit and standby letters of credit, 
both the banks and the courts view them as identical financial instruments. Due to the 
difficulty of adaptating the new uses of letters of credit to the applicable laws, greater risks 
have been created for all the parties to a letter of credit contract. As a result, the entire 
letter of credit system has been recently threatened by the unusual, though not necessarily 
uncommon, political situation in Iran which triggered numerous standby letter of credit 
disputes.' The cessation of commercial relations between industrialized nations and 
1 The Comptroller of the Currency has defined the standby letter of credit as follows: 
A "standby letter of credit" is any letter of credit or similar arrangement however named or 
described, which represents an obligation to the beneficiary on the part of the issuer (1) to repay 
money borrowed or advanced for the account of the account party or (2) to make payment on 
account of any indebtedness undertaken by the account party, or (3) to make any payment on 
account of any default by the account party in the performance of an obligation. 12 C.F.R. § 7, 
1160(a) (1979). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. ("FDIC") have similarly defined standbys. 12 
C.F.R. 337.2(a) (1979); See also Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Regulation H, 
12 C.F.R. § 208(d) (1979). 
2 "Standby credits have been used in connection with construction projects both to secure the 
payment of commitment fees to permanent lenders, and to secure interim lenders against the 
developers' failure to obtain permanent financing. They have likewise been used as performance 
bonds seeking developers' obligations to municipal government, as substitutes for working capital 
deposits by developers in connection with H. U.D. - insured mortgages, as security for payment of 
notes given by purchasers of real estate, and as security for the insurance of security bonds in 
connection with various incidents of the litigation process. They have also been utilized, with great 
frequency and success, to support the insurance of commercial paper by corporate borrowers." 
Weisz and Blackman, Standby Letters of Credit After Iran: Remedies of the Account Party. 1982 U. ILL. L. 
REv. 355, 359. The two most common uses of standby letters of credit in international transactions 
have been as good performance guarantees and advance payment standbys. See notes 13-22 and 
accompanying text. 
3 A traditional letter of credit is secured by a buyer from a bank in the amount of the purchase 
price for the benefit of a seller so that neither party will have both the goods and the money at the 
same time. See notes 6-12 and accompanying text. 
4 To condemn the imperialistic tendencies of industralized nations actng in concert with an 
overthrown government is a natural, often mandated action for a new government to take to stop the 
alleged oppression of its people. Unfortunately, the new government must often condemn the 
innocent along with the not so innocent parties, either because the new government cannot tell the 
difference, or because its people could not be expected to tell the difference. In Iran, this militant 
hatred for everything American was opposed only by the moderate voice of Sadegh Ghotbzadeh. As 
a result, he fell from power and was executed as a traitor. 
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governments in Third World countries sparks efforts to enjoin payments of standby 
letters of credit, either because demands for their payment might be fraudulent, or 
because large payments are still owed by the party demanding payment under the 
standby letters of credit. 
This article will discuss the basic functional differences between traditional letters of 
credit and standby letters of credit. The discussion will focus on the difficulties faced by 
courts when they have applied the usual rules of judicial review, originally developed for 
traditional letters of credit, to standby letters of credit. Part I will discuss the basic 
differences between standby and traditional letters of credit. Part II will discuss the main 
issues involved in letter of credit disputes: nonconformity of documentary demands, 
fraud in the transaction, indispensable parties, and letter of credit disputes versus dis-
putes on the contract. Part III will discuss Itek Corporation v. First National Bank of Boston 
and Bank Melli Iran. 5 This is the only case in which a permanent injunction was issued by a 
federal district court enjoining an American bank from honoring a demand by the 
Iranian bank for payments allegedly made in conformance with certain standby letters of 
credit. The discussion will cover force majeure clauses, non-conformity of documents 
presented, fraud in the transaction under VCC § 5-114, and the Iranian bank as a 
government entity. Part IV will recommend the restructuring of letters of credit so that 
the requirements will reflect both the use to which the letter of credit will be put and will 
bring all types of letters of credit in line with the applicable laws. 
1. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND STANDBY 
LETTERS OF CREDIT 
A. Traditional Letters of Credit 
The traditional letter of credit has become an invaluable tool in international transac-
tions. It is also known as a commercial or documentary letter of credit.6 The traditional 
letter of credit is used in international business transactions for goods in which the seller 
and the buyer are separated by long distances, have different legal systems, and do not 
trust each other. Letters of credit avoid placing either party in the position of controlling 
both the goods and the money at the same time. 7 To avoid this problem, the contracting 
parties agree to involve a third party: preferably a large, stable, and internationally known 
bank with branches in the countries of both buyer and seller. In this ideal situation, the 
buyer procures a letter of credit in favor of the seller from the bank. Once informed of 
the transaction between the buyer and the bank, the seller has the added comfort of the 
good credit standing of the bank as opposed to the unknown credit standing of the buyer. 
The letter of credit is usually irrevocable8 and the creditworthiness of the buyer is now 
5 No. 80-58 Slip Opinion (D. Mass., May 25, 1982), No. 83-1632 Slip Opinion (1st Cir. March 29, 
1983). 
6 A traditional letter of credit is perhaps best described as a documentary letter of credit. 
However, because some standby letters of credit are also documentary, for the purposes of this 
article, the two types will be referred to as traditional and standby letters of credit. 
7 Note, Enjoining the International Standlry Letter of Credit: The Iranian Letter of Credit Cases, 21 
HARV. INT'L LJ. 189, 191 (1980), Note, The Role of Standby Letters of Credit in International Commerce: 
Reflections After iran, 20 VA. J. INT'L. L. 459, 461 (1980). 
8 The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as UCC] leaves open the question of 
whether an unmarked letter of credit is irrevocable or revocable, thus allowing courts to determine 
revocability ba.sed on custom and usage. UCC § 5-103 Comment 1 (1977). The UNIFORM CUSTOMS 
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the bank's concern, not the seller's. At this point the seller may not simply demand 
payment from the bank: he must produce a series of documents previously agreed upon 
by the buyer and himself. The particular documents are stipulated in the agreement 
between the buyer and the bank. They usually show that the goods, such as wheat, have 
been shipped in the proper amount, at the proper time, and are of the proper quality. 
Once the seller has these documents, he must present them to the bank. If the bank 
decides that the documents conform to the agreement between the seller and bank, as 
agreed upon by the buyer and the seller, the bank will honor the seller's demand for 
payment.9 The transaction is then complete. 
The legal problems which arise in the above transaction occur because of poor 
drafting of the underlying contract, the use of documents in the credit transaction which 
fail to protect the buyer, dishonesty on the part of the seller who ships inferior or 
different goods, or dishonesty on the part of a seller who presents fraudulent documents 
to the bank for payment. Even if the buyer has told the bank that the seller has breached 
the underlying contract, when the documents conform on their face to the letter of credit 
agreement, the bank must honor the demand for payment, unless the buyer can show 
that the seller has perpetrated a fraud in the transaction.10 The legal premise is that 
letters of credit are totally independent of the underlying contract.11 In the absence of 
fraud in the transaction, which is the lone exception, banks will honor a conforming 
demand for payment in the interest of protecting their own reputation. 12 This leaves any 
dispute over aspects of the underlying contract to be settled between the contracting 
parties. 
B. Standby Letters of Credit 
As can be inferred from the traditional letter of credit situation outlined above, all 
aspects of the transaction are tangible: the goods, the letters of credit, and the documents 
- all of which maintain the desirable balance in international transactions. Standby letters 
of credit are used when the contract obligations become more complicated and the parties 
still wish to maintain a balance of interests. Standby letters are not only used before 
complete performance has occurred, but afterwards, as a warranty that the goods will 
perform as promised by the seller. Standby letters of credit can also be issued in favor of 
the buyer equal to the amount of the down payment on the contract price to guard against 
a complete default by the seller.13 The basic problem with, and the main advantage of, 
standby letters of credit is the variety of uses to which this low-cost security mechanism 
can be put. 
AND PRACTICES FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS in Article l(c) specifies that if a letter of credit is not 
marked irrevocable then it is presumed to be revocable. International Chambers of Commerce, 
UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS, Brochure 222, Art. l(c) (rev. ed. 
1962) [hereinafter cited as UCP]. 
9 UCC § 5-109, supra note 8. 
10 UCC § 5-114(2)(c), supra note 8. 
11 UCC § 5-114, Comment, § 5-109(2), UCP, General Provision (c), supra note 8. 
12 A bank which wrongfully refuses to honor a conforming demand on a letter of credit 
jeopardizes its reputation in international commerce, especially when another bank has already 
accepted and paid under a documentary demand and is seeking reimbursement from the bank 
which originally issued the letter of credit. 
13 These two types of standbys were the most common letters of credit involved in the Iranian 
litigation. 
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The situation outlined below illustrates the use of a standby letter as a performance 
guarantee both before and after complete performance has occurred. In this case, as in 
the previous discussion of traditional letters, the buyer and the seller are separated by 
distance, legal systems, and a lack of mutual trust. Instead of wheat, which was an 
appropriate commodity in the previous situation, the goods involved in this case could be 
heat sensors for use in guided missile systems. For the sake of illustration, the bank parties 
involved are also different. 14 This is partly because it is now the seller who is arranging fOF 
the standby letter instead of the buyer, who has insisted that the seller back up his heat 
sensors with a financial guarantee. IS 
In this case, the seller arranges with his bank in the U.S. to issue a standby letter of 
credit in favor of a bank in the buyer's country. Should the buyer decide that the seller has 
defaulted on the contract or that the goods do not perform as promised, the buyer may 
make a demand on his bank for payment under the standby letter of credit by giving his 
bank the documents required by the standby letter of credit contract. The buyer's bank 
pays the buyer and then informs the seller's bank that it has been required to pay the 
agreed amount of the standby letter of credit. In return, the seller's bank must pay the 
buyer's bank, and the seller is liable to his bank for the amount paid under the standby 
letter of credit.16 
Considering the example above, it should be clear that the standby letter of credit is 
not intended to be drawn upon, whereas all the parties to a traditional letter of credit 
expect that the seller will demand payment for his goods once he has the required 
documents in hand. 
It is also usually true as regards standby letters that the buyer must only produce a 
draft along with a document which states that the seller has defaulted in his performance 
of the contract, or that the goods do not perform as promised by the seller. Unlike the 
traditional letter of credit arrangement where at least some of the documents required 
are issued by a third party, such as shipping documents and documents of title, the 
14 In letter of credit terms, the party requesting its bank to issue a letter of credit is called the 
bank's customer or the account party. The bank which originally issues the letters of credit is called 
the issuing bank. The foreign bank which accepts the documents and pays the demand is called a 
confirming bank; the demanding party is called the beneficiary. In a back-to-back credit arrange-
ment such as this, there are really two letters of credit: one issued by the American bank for its 
customer naming the foreign bank as beneficiary, and one issued by the foreign bank naming the 
demanding party as beneficiary. The opportunity for confusion and misunderstanding is thus 
doubled. This article will use the terms interchangeably. UCC § 5-103, supra note 8. 
15 If a transaction is international,. the foreign bank involved may issue a guarantee, which 
unlike a letter of credit, allows the bank to look at elements of underlying contract. A guarantee is, 
therefore, more than a letter of credit; it is more like a surety bond. In the United States, banks are 
forbidden by law to issue financial guarantees of this kind. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976). Foreign branches of 
United States banks are allowed to issue financial guarantees. If a standby letter of credit is properly 
drafted, it is much less costly than a financial guarantee. This is true for both the bank and its 
customer because a financial guarantee requires the issuing bank to be as expert in the business 
matter for which the guarantee was issued. Without expertise the bank cannot make an intelligent 
decision on whether a demand for payment under the guarantee should be paid. A standby letter of 
credit, on the other hand, requires the customer, who will already have expertise, to seek iIlJunctive 
relief when the paying bank is about to pay against an alleged fraudulent demand. UCC § 5-114(2) 
(b) supra note 8. Interestingly enough, the difference between standbys and guarantees was not 
discussed in the Iranian cases. In addition, the UCP does not allow guarantees in financial contracts 
containing the standard clause which states that the credit is subject to the UCP. UCP, Art. 8, supra n. 
8. 
16 UCC § 5-114(3), supra note 8. 
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documents for a standby letter of credit are produced by the buyer. This is an aspect of 
the commercial relationship which requires that the seller have a considerable amount of 
faith in the honesty of the buyer who could easily make a fraudulent demand with 
conforming documents. There can thus be no reliance on the impartiality of a third party 
issuer of documents in the standby credit arrangement unless such a third party issuer is 
required under the contract. 
The differences between traditional and standby letters of credit have been briefly 
discussed above. Their simplicity and utility support their widespread use in many other 
forms as well.!7 The risks and potential losses in standby letter of credit transactions are 
clearly far greater than in traditional letter of credit disputes.!S Yet, as has been men-
tioned, they are legally viewed as identical forms of commercial transactions. The courts 
are constrained to follow forms of judicial review developed well before the novel uses to 
which the standby letter of credit has been applied. As courts develop equitable remedies 
in their attempts to adjudicate fairly standby letters of credit disputes, there is a danger 
that the tremendous value of letters of credit will be undermined. 
As the VCC specifically requires, unless the seller can legitimately allege some sort of 
fraud in the transaction, a court may not look at the underlying contract.!9 Nevertheless, a 
court cannot, without looking to the provisions of the contract, determine the legitimacy 
of such a claim in a standby letter of credit dispute where the buyer claims that the seller 
has breached the underlying contract. 
The same is true for the bank on whom the demand for payment is made. Although 
the seller may insist that the demand is fraudulent, the bank may not look beyond 
compliance with the documentary requirements of the letter of credit to determine the 
validity of its customer's assertion.20 The seller must seek a court injunction against his 
bank disallowing payment under the letter of credit.2! Without an injunction, payment is 
made, and the seller must seek redress, usually in the foreign courts of the buyer's 
country, for wrongfully demanded payments by the buyer.22 
II. ISSUFS INVOLVED IN LETTER OF CREDIT DISPUTFS 
A. Nonconformity of Documents 
The courts, when confronted with an assertion that documentary demands under 
letters of credit are nonconforming, must determine whether a documentary demand is 
sufficiently nonconforming so as to enjoin payment,23 or whether the inconsistencies of a 
11 See note 2, supra. 
18. The risks are greater because the beneficiary issues all documents required for a conforming 
demand, and the potential losses are greater because a standby credit involves no goods which might 
be used as collateral. 
19 VCC § 5-114, supra note 8. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 In most, if not all of the contracts with the Imperial Government of Iran, the provisions 
required that disputes on the contract were to be adjudicated in Iranian courts. Such a provision is 
not uncommon in international contracts with governments in developing countries where the 
government has a strong bargaining position. 
23 Courtaulds North America Inc. v. North Carolina National Bank, 528 F.2d. 802 (4th Cir. 
1975); insurance Company of North America v. Heritage Bank, 595 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1979); see 
notes 53-85 and accompanying text. 
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demand are so minimal that an injunction should not be issued.24 Secondary problems 
include the relationships of the demands on letters of credit to their corresponding 
expiration dates,25 the duty of the paying bank to inform the beneficiary of non-
conforming demands,26 and the potential injury to international banks in a back-to-back 
credit arrangement when one bank has paid under conforming demands and the other 
bank has not paid due to nonconforming demandsP 
There is clearly a conflict among the circuits as to whether courts should adopt an 
equitable doctrine of substantial compliance, which allows for minor inconsistencies, or 
adhere to the more traditional strict compliance doctrine. Under this doctrine, the 
documents submitted must strictly comply with the terms of the letters of credit, or the 
issuing bank will not be obligated to pay the beneficiary.28 The cases discussed below 
involve both traditional and standby letters of credit. 
1. Strict Compliance 
In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank and Air North Associates, Equibank refused to 
honor Chase's demand for payment under a standby letter because Equibank found the 
initial demand to be nonconforming. A later pr()per demand was not honored because 
the expiration date on the letter had passed. The court of appeals vacated and remanded 
the district court's summary judgment for the defendant Equibank.29 
The circuit court based its decision to remand on the unresolved issue of whether or 
not Equibank had waived the timeliness requirement through one of its employees. The 
employee had allegedly told a Chase representative on the day of expiration that Chase 
could send t'he documents through Equibank's domestic collections. Such a method would 
delay delivery of the documents by several days, a fact commonly known in the banking 
business.3o Nevertheless, despite the remand, which went against Equibank, the circuit 
court made several findings of fact in Equibank's favor which reaffirmed the doctrine of 
strict compliance. The court also outlined the different parties' obligations and rights in 
situations involving modifications and waivers.31 
In this case, the three parties were involved in a long-term financing arrangement.32 
In 1971, Chase agreed to provide Air North Associates with long-term financing for motel 
construction near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.33 As a prerequisite for the loan agreement, 
Chase required a standby letter of credit in its favor which would be called upon if Air 
24 Banco Espagnol de Credito v, State Street Bank and Trust Co., 385 F.2d 239 (1st CiL 1967); 
Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants National Bank of Boston and Chemical Bank, 569 
F.2d 699 (1st CiL 1978), See notes 86-142 and accompanying text. 
25 Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank and Air North Associates, 550 F.2d 882 (3d CiL 1977); 
see notes 29-52 and accompanying text. 
26 VCP supra, note 8 at Art. 8(e). 
27 Banco Espagnol.de Credito v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230 (1st CiL 1967); 
see notes 86-118 and accompanying text. 
28 Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882 (3d CiL 1977); Courtaulds North America 
Inc. v. North Carolina National Bank, 528 F.2d 802 (4th CiL 1975); see notes 29-66 and accompany-
ing text. 
29 Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882 (3d CiL 1977). 
30 550 F.2d at 886. 
31 Id. 
32 550 F.2d at 884. 
33 Id. 
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North did not complete the loan transaction in accordance with the agreement.34 At Air 
North's request, Equibank, a Pittsburgh bank, issued an irrevocable letter of credit in 
Chase's favor.35 The letter provided for payment upon presentation of a sight draft 
accompanied by certification from Chase that Air North had defaulted.36 The letter of 
credit for $108,000 expired on April 30, 1973.37 
On April 27, when Air North did not appear for the scheduled closing of the loan 
agreement, Chase immediately sent a telex to Equibank which requested payment under 
the standby letter of credit. The telex failed to certify that Air North had defaulted, 
although both Equibank and Chase knew that Air North could have been declared in 
default weeks before April 27.38 In fact, in letters sent by Chase to Equibank on April 10 
and 26, Chase referred to items of construction not performed in accordance with the 
original committment by Air North.39 The letters, however, did not use the word "de-
fault," did not mention the letters of credit, and did not demand payment.40 Chase 
asserted that the letters did certify that Air North had defaulted and so met the default 
document requirement of the standby. The circuit court stated that the "letters did not 
constitute certification of default as required by the letter of credit."41 The circuit court 
also agreed with the district court's "insistence upon strict compliance with the conditions 
stated in the letter of credit."42 The circuit court went one step further by holding Chase 
to a higher standard, noting that the strict compliance "requirement is all the more 
appropriate here where Chase, the beneficiary, must be presumed to be knowledgeable 
about banking practices."43 In support of its conclusion, the circuit court cited UCC 
§ 5-1 03( l)(a) which states "that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment 
upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit."44 The court also found 
support from the Courtaulds case in the Fourth Circuit which quoted Harfield: "There is 
no room for documents which are almost the same, or which will do just as well."45 
Although Equibank was aware of Air North's failure to meet its committments, the court 
held that this does not excuse strict compliance with the. terms of the letter of credit.46 The 
court approvingly referred to Harfield's "fear that the sacred cow of equity will trample 
the tender vines of letter of credit law."47 Finally, in regard to the nonconformity of 
Chase's demand, the court noted that "the utility and advantages of the letter of credit 











43 Id . 
•• Id.; 12A PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5103(1)(a) (Purdon 1970). 
45 550 F.2d at 885 citing Courtaulds North American Inc. v. North Carolina National Bank, 528 
F.2d 802, 806 (4th Cir. 1975); H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 73 (5th ed. 1974). 
48 550 F.2d at 885. 
47 550 F.2d at 885, n. 4; Harfield, Code, Customs and Conscience in Letter-or-Credit Law, 4 
U.C.C.L.]. 7, 11 (1972). 
48 550 F.2d at 885. 
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On the subject of the modification and waiver of obligations in letters of credit, the 
court continued to follow legal principles as opposed to equitable remedies. The court 
accepted the principle that an issuing bank may not modify an irrevocable letter of credit 
without its customer's consent, but held that a lack of consent does not per se prevent 
recovery by the beneficiary.49 
If the issuing bank by choice or inadvertence, waives a restriction in the letter 
of credit and pays the beneficiary despite the non-compliance, the issuer 
jeopardizes its right to reimbursement from its customer. The possibility that 
the issuer may not be able to recover from its customer, however, does not bar 
the beneficiary in his suit against the bank. The beneficiary bases his claim on 
the letter of credit as modifed by the bank and acceptable to him - not on the 
agreement between the ~ustomer and the issuing bank, nor upon the underly-
ing arrangement between customer and beneficiary.50 
In a final caveat, the court noted that on remand, "it must be determined whether 
Chase can claim reliance upon a conversation which occurred only three hours before the 
close of banking hours."51 Under the UCP which governed this particular letter of credit, 
"banks are under no obligation to accept presentation of documents outside their banking 
hours."52 In other words, Chase might have missed the expiration date anyway, whether 
or not it had been mislead by the alleged modification. 
In Courtaulds North America Inc. v. North Carolina National Bank, the circuit court for 
the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's finding for the beneficiary, Courtaulds, 
and adhered to the strict compliance doctrine on documentary demands in letter of credit 
disputes.53 In this case, which involved a traditional letter of credit used for the purchase 
and sale of knitting yarns, the issuing bank refused to honor Courtaulds' demand for 
payment. The bank's customer, Adastra, said it could not allow the bank to waive any 
discrepancies in the documentary demand because a trustee in bankruptcy had been 
appointed for Adastra. Adastra, therefore, no longer had the ability to waive discrepan-
cies, as it had in the past.54 
The terms of the letter of credit required, among other things, that Courtaulds 
present a commercial invoice in triplicate stating that it covered 100,000 pounds, 100% 
Acrylic Yarn.55 The main discrepancy was that the invoices stated that the goods were 
"Imported Acrylic Yarn" as opposed to "100% Acrylic Yarn,"56 as required by the letter 
of credit terms.57 Even though packing lists attached to the invoices clearly said that the 
goods were 100% Acrylic Yarn, the court held that packing lists could not be considered 
part of the invoice even though they were appended to it. Neither could the invoices be 
read as one with the lists.58 In support of its conclusion, the court pointed to Article 9 of 
the UCP which states that "the description of the goods in the commercial invoice must 
49 550 F.2d at 886. 
50 Id. 
51 550 F.2d at 887. 
52 VCP supra note 8, at Art. 42. 
53 Courtaulds North America Inc. v. North Carolina National Bank, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 
1975). 
54 528 F.2d at 804. 
55 528 F.2d. at 803. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 528 F.2d at 806. 
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correspond with the description in the credit. In the remaining documents, the goods 
may be described in general terms."59 
During the life of the letter of credit, Courtaulds had often submitted non-
conforming demands which failed to state on the invoices that the goods were 100% 
Acrylic Yarn.60 Previously, the bank had always called Adastra and received approval of 
the documents before paying Courtaulds.61 Letter of credit law allows a bank's customer 
to waive discrepancies in documents.62 The court also noted that it is not the custom and 
practice in the banking trade for a bank to notify a beneficiary of any deficiencies in the 
draft or the documents, if they are waived by the customer.63 The court then added that, 
"obviously, the previous acceptances of truant invoices cannot be construed as a waiver in 
the present incident."64 
Unfortunately for Courtaulds, by the time the bank received documents which 
conformed to the terms of the letters of credit, the credit had expired, so the bank 
legitimately refused again to honor the demand.65 As the court pointed out, "no prece-
dent is cited to justify retroactive amendment of the invoices or extension of the credit 
beyond the August 15 expiry of the letter."66 
This case is important in letter of credit law because it stands for the proposition that 
not only must all the documents required under the terms of (he letter of credit be 
present, but each of them must also conform on their face to the terms of the credit. 
Such a requirement is particularly useful in the standby letter of credit situation 
where only one or two documents prepared and delivered by the beneficiary are re-
quired. Thus, if a beneficiary does not conform his demands precisely to the terms of the 
letter of credit, he may find that his sloppy disregard of letter of credit law will bar his 
ability to collect, especially if he has waited until the last minute to make his demands. 
This may appear inequitable, but it should be remembered that Courtaulds could still sue 
Adastra on the contract since they received the goods for free. Of course, because Adastra 
was bankrupt, recovery might be slow and inadequate. The bank, however, would have 
been in the same situation as Courtaulds had it honored a non-conforming demand which 
Adastra could refuse to pay because the bank failed to adhere to the terms of the letter of 
credit. 
In Insurance Company of North America v. Heritage Bank, another Third Circuit case, the 
court held that the Insurance Company of North America's ["INA"] demands for pay-
ment from Heritage Bank ["Heritage"] under a standby letter were nonconforming, 
even though the terms of the letter were so poorly worded that the court agreed with 
INA's contention that "no particular incantation was necessary."67 
In this case, a standby letter of credit was issued by Heritage with INA as ben-
eficiary.68 The purpose of the letter was to induce INA to post an appeal bond for 
Horace and Jean Billings who were appealing an adverse judgment that had been 
59 UCP supra note 8, at Art. 9. 
60 528 F.2d at 804. 
61 Id. 
62 528 F.2d at 807 citing the District Court's Findings of Fact, 387 F. Supp. 92 (M.D.N.C. 1975). 
63 Id. 
64 528 F.2d at 807. 
65 528 F.2d at 804. 
66 528 F.2d at 807. 
67 Insurance Company of North America v. Heritage Bank, 595 F.2d 171, 175 (3rd Cir. 1979). 
68 595 F.2d at 172. 
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entered against them by the Pennsylvania state court system.69 Heritage issued the letter 
in the amount of $78,673.00, the same amount as the appeal bond. 70 By its terms, the 
letter expired on October 21, 1977.71 The pertinent part of the letter required Heritage to 
honor INA's "drafts at sight accompanied by written evidence to the effect that ... you 
[INA] have not received evidence satisfactory to you of the performance by the Principals 
of all its [sic] obligations in connection with which the aforesaid bond was issued."72 
Nine days before the expiration date of the standby letter of credit, the appeal was 
still pending. 73 Because there was apparently no provision for extension of the letter of 
credit, and because INA did not wish to find itself in the position of paying on the appeal 
bond after the letter of credit posted as security for that bond had expired, INA 
demanded payment.74 As its demand, INA presented Heritage with a sight draft for the 
full amount of the appeal bond and certified that their liability under the bond was still 
outstanding.75 When Heritage refused to honor INA's demand, allegedly at the request 
of its customers, the Billingses, INA filed suit seeking payment.76 Meanwhile, the letter of 
credit expired, the Billingses lost their appeal, and INA was required to pay the judgment 
holder under the terms of the appeal bond.77 
The district court held that INA was not authorized under the terms of the letter of 
credit to demand payment in the circumstances outlined above, and that, even if they had 
been authorized to do so, under the rules of strict compliance, INA's demand failed to 
conform to the requirements of the letter of credit. 78 The court of appeals held, as did the 
district court that "under the appeal bond the Billingses were under no duty to exonerate 
INA from liability before the appeal was concluded so long as they prosecuted the appeal 
with effect, and that consequently it could not be said that the Billingses had not per-
formed all their obligations at the time INA demanded payment from Heritage."79 In 
addition, the circuit court concluded that even if Heritage had granted INA a blank 
check, as standby letters of credit often appear to be, it was "evident that INA did not 
properly fill in the blanks."80 The circuit court adhered to the strict compliance doctrine 
of Chase Manhattan v. Equibank, supra, and rejected the persuasive reasoning of First 
Circuit cases discussed infra ,81 which allow for only substantial compliance with letter of 
credit terms. The circuit court held that the fact that "the liability ... is still outstanding"82 
simply did not constitute "written evidence satisfactory to [it] of the performance by the 
[Billingses] of all [their] obligations in connection with which the aforesaid bond was 
issued."83 
The court goes on to substantiate its decision by pointing out that "any decision to the 
69 595 F.2d at 171, 172. 










80 595 F.2d at 174. 
81 See notes 86-142 and accompanying text. 
82 595 F.2d at 175. 
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contrary would impose upon Heritage more than it had bargained for. . and would 
threaten the foundations upon which the letter of credit has grown and flourished."84 
That foundation, the court added, is strict compliance, without which, "banks may 
become reluctant to assume the additional risks of litigation."85 
INA's loss can clearly be attributed to poor drafting of the letter of credit require-
ments. In particular it lacked a provision which would extend the expiration date; and 
terms which would define the obligations of the principals, should have been included. 
2. Substantial Compliance 
Despite the learned discourse on the advantages of the doctrine of strict compliance 
in letter of credit law, the First Circuit has attempted to reach equitable results in difficult 
cases by substituting strict compliance requirements for a doctrine of substantial com-
pliance. 
In Banco Espagnol de Credito v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., the First Circuit reversed 
a lower court's ruling that documents presented to State Street by Banco Espagnol were 
nonconforming.86 This case presents a confusing set of facts in a back-to-back credit 
arrangement involving traditional letters of credit. The letters were used to pay for 
clothes purchased from two Spanish manufacturers. 
The buyer, Lawrence, contracted with two Spanish manufacturers, Alcides and 
Longeur, to purchase clothing.87 As a condition of the contract, Lawrence was required to 
procure two traditional letters of credit naming the clothing manufacturers as ben-
eficiaries.88 This was done in a back-to-back credit arrangement with State Street acting 
as the issuing bank (the bank which issued the letters of credit for its customer, Lawrence), 
and Banco Espagnol acting as the advising bank (the bank which would advise State Street 
that it had received conforming documents and had paid the beneficiary, thus obligating 
State Street to pay Banco Espagnol). The letters of credit required signed invoices, 
inspection certificates, and full sets of "clean on board" ocean bills of lading dated not 
later than March 31, 1963.89 
The problems with this seemingly simple arrangement began because the parties to 
the contract had never decided who would issue the inspection certificates which were 
required under the terms of the letters of credit.90 Finally, on March 1, 1963, the two 
letters of credit were amended to require an inspection certificate issued by Supervigilan-
cia which would certify that "the goods were in conformity with the order."91 
The next problem was to ascertain which of the documents involved in the transac-
tions should have been considered as "the order" to which the inspected goods should 
have conformed. On the record, neither court could find any document purporting to be 
the order for goods manufactured by Longeur. 92 To make matters even more confusing, 
84 595 F.2d at 175, 176. 
85 595 F.2d at 176. 
86 Banco Espagnol de Credito v. State Street Bank and Trust Company, 385 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 
1967). 
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the court found two sets of documents which could be called the orders for goods 
manufactured by Alcides.93 After considering the details surrounding the issuing of the 
different orders, the courts concluded that a set of stock-sheets dated November 13, 1962, 
supplanted other documents dated a week earlier, despite the fact that the earlier 
documents were clearly marked as orders.94 As a result of this conclusion, the court was 
faced with a notation found on the stock sheets (and not on the orders) which required 
that the coats and jackets were "to be as sample inspected in Spain."9s 
Subsequent to March 12, 1963, the date on which the manufacturers requested 
Supervigilancia to begin inspection, Lawrence became concerned that the quality of the 
goods shipped might not be the same as the samples. Lawrence therefore sent a confusing 
barrage of cables to Spain.96 The cables instructed Supervigilancia not to inspect the 
goods, nor issue a certificate, until it had received approved samples of the goods through 
Lawrence.97 At this point, they were only five days away from March 31, the latest day the 
bills of lading could be dated and still conform to the requirements of the letters of 
credit.9s Apparently at the insistence of the manufacturers, Supervigilancia proceeded 
with the inspection in a manner which they hoped was acceptable to Lawrence, though 
they hedged by issuing the inspection certificates "under reserves."99 They then noted 
that this was not because of any problem with the goods, but because of the confusion and 
because of differences created by the cabled messages. IOO 
Supervigilancia had accepted samples for comparison from the manufacturers 
which, the manufacturers swore in front of a Public Notary, were the same as samples 
accepted by Lawrence's delegate when he was in Spain. lol The beneficiaries believed that 
was in conformance with the stock sheet requirement that the goods "be as sample 
inspected in Spain."102 
After receiving the inspection certificate, the manufacturers were able to meet the 
deadline date of March 31 for the bills of lading. l03 When all the required documents 
were issued to Banco Espagnol, the bank determined that the documents submitted 
appeared on their faces to comply with the terms of the credit. Banco Espagnol therefore 
honored them, and made payment on March 28 and 29.104 
State Street Bank, however, refused to honor Banco Espagnol's draft on it for 
payment under the letters of credit because State Street found the accompanying inspec-
tion certificates nonconforming to the terms of the credit. lOs Instead of the certificates 
certifying that the goods conformed to the order, State Street believed that the certificates 
merely indicated conformity to samples alleged by the seller to correspond to other 
samples allegedly approved by the buyer. l06 State Street also noted that the certificates 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 385 F.2d at 233. 
96 385 F.2d at 232. 
97 Id. 
98 385 F.2d at 233. 
99 Id. 
100 385 F.2d at 236. 
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were not unqualified, as required by the letters of credit, but were issued under reserves, 
and were, therefore, unacceptable!07 
By adhering to the strict conformity doctrine, the district court sustained State 
Street's refusal to pay by finding that the certificates were nonconforming. lOB The First 
Circuit, however, in what could be considered a major departure from the strict com-
pliance doctrine in letter of credit law, reversed the district court by holding that there is 
"some leaven in the loaf of strict construction. Not only does haec verba not control 
absolutely, ... but some courts now cast their eyes on a wider scene than a single 
document."lo9 As support for this assertion, the First Circuit cited one New York case,110 
one British case,!ll and two law review articles.uz The court goes on to differentiate 
between the long line of cases adhering to strict construction and its holding by noting 
that those cases "turn on discrepancies between the actual terms of invoices or bills of 
lading and requirements of a letter of credit."ll3 The difference in this case, the court 
asserted, was that the buyer was trying to ensure quality of the goods in conformity with 
its order. By so doing, the buyer "neglected to specify how it would conduct the inspection 
operation, leaving only the bland instruction that the goods must conform to the or-
ders."ll4 The court went on to hold, "that [Supervigilancia] took the word, under oath, of 
the seller as to the appropriateness of the sample is no more than any inspector must 
ordinarily do."1l5 The court claimed that, 
[t]o hold otherwise - that a buyer could frustrate an international transaction 
on the eve of fulfillment by a challenge to authenticity of sample would make 
vulnerable many such arrangements where third parties are vested by buyer 
with inspection responsibilities but where, apart from their own competence 
and integrity, there is no guarantee of the sample itself. 1l6 
Finally, with reference to the inspection certificate issued "llnder reserves," the court 
correctly ~oted the fact that the certificate was only issued under reserves because of the 
underlying dispute between the buyer and seller, "which could not be the concern of the 
advising bank."ll7 Of course, this assumes that the inspector could legitimately issue an 
inspection certificate while the parties to the transaction were still in dispute as to how the 
inspection should actually be conducted. Nevertheless, the First Circuit held that, "the 
inspection certificate in this case conformed in all significant respects to the requirements 
of the letter of credit."llB But if Lawrence could amend the letter of credit to specify 
Supervigilancia as the inspector, why couldn't he amend the bill of lading date to 
accommodate a proper inspection? If the parties had proceeded in this manner, rather 
than panicking over the March 31 deadline, this case would never have been considered 
by any court of law. 
Eleven years after the First Circuit issued its opinion in Banco Espagnol, the court 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 385 F.2d at 234. 
110 O'Meara v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636, 39A.L.R. 747 (1925). 
111 Midland Bank Ltd. v. Seymour, 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 147 (Q.B. 1955). 
112 Miller, Problems & Patterns of the Letter of Credit, U. ILL. L.F. 162, at 170, n. 45. (1959). 
113 385 F.2d at 234. 
114 385 F.2d at 236. 
115 Id. 
116 385 F.2d at 237. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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reaffirmed its judicially constructed doctrine of substantial compliance in the case of 
Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants National Bank of Boston and Chemical 
Bank.119 Although the First Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's summary 
judgment for the beneficiary based on questions of fact as to whether timely- present-
ment of the documents required under the letter of credit had been made, the circuit 
court held that, "variance between documents specified [in a letter of credit] and docu-
ments submitted is not fatal if there is no possibility that the documents could mislead the 
paying bank to its detriment."12o 
When applied to the actual facts of the case, the above statement does not appear to 
be so unreasonable. The danger, however, lies in the future use of portions of the opinion 
which could be taken out of the context of the particular facts to which it applied. This is 
especially dangerous here because of the extremely confusing fact pattern in Flagship 
Cruises. l21 The ease with which the holding in this case could be misapplied may prove to 
be too much of a burden. With too great a risk of litigation, banks may not continue 
dealing in letter of credit unless some changes occur. 
In this case, Chris Travel, Inc. of Rhode Island owed $200,000 to Flagship Cruises, 
Ltd., a Bermuda corporation, for an unstated reason.122 Chris Travel's bank, Citizens 
Trust Co., requested Merchants Bank to issue an irrevocable letter of credit naming 
Flagship, an agent of Flagship Cruises, Ltd., as beneficiary.123 The terms of the letter of 
credit required among other things, 
[t]hat all drafts must be marked: 'drawn under NEMNB Credit No. 18506'; 
(4) that each draft must be accompanied by [Flagship's] signed statement that 
draft is in conjunction with the Letter of Agreement dated May 23, 1972 and 
Addendum dated June 15, 1972; (5) that drafts must be negotiated no later 
than November 3, 1972.124 
In October, 1972, Flagship delivered all the necessary documents to its bank, Chemi-
cal Bank.12s There were several inconsistencies in ~he documents: Flagship Cruises, Ltd., 
as opposed to Flagship, was named as beneficiary/26 the drafts did not say, "Drawn under 
NEMNB Credit No. 18506," but instead named Merchants in the draft and noted the 
number 18506 below the bank's name,127 and the signed statement required from Flag-
ship said the letter of credit, rather than "the draft" was in conjunction with the Letter of 
Agreement and the Addendum.128 
Unfo"rtunately, the documents were not sent to Chemical's Letter of Credit Depart-
ment, where they would have been examined and payment made immediately. Instead, 
the documents went to Chemical's International Collections Department, which merely 
forwarded the drafts to Merchants for payment.129 The form forwarding the documents 
119 Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants National Bank of Boston, 569 F.2d 699 
(1st Cir. 1978). 
120 569 F.2d at 705. 
121 569 F.2d at 701, 702. 
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was dated November 3, but was not mailed until November 6, and, even then, Chemical 
neglected to include the required signed statements from Flagship.130 
By the time the documents, less the required signed statement, had arrived at 
Merchants on November 9, Chris Travel had gone bankrupt. Its bank, Citizens, had 
informed Merchants that since the credit had not been drawn upon on or before 
November 3, it should not be honored.131 Merchant informed Flagship's bank, Chemical, 
that the demand was nonconforming due to late presentation and the lack of the 
required signed statement.132 
Chemical, in an effort to cover for its mistake, sent notice to Merchants on November 
13 that it had "negotiated" the documents by November 3, in conformance with Article 8 
of the UCP, that the required signed statement had been inadvertently omitted when 
Chemical sent the other documents, and that it had been mailed and would arrive 
shortly.133 By the time the required statement arrived on November 16, Merchants had 
already said it was too late.134 
On appeal, even the First Circuit thought the district court had stretched the doctrine 
of substantial compliance as applied in Banco Espalfltol.135 Though the First Circuit 
stopped far short of reversing its decision in Banco Espalfltol, it did hold that the district 
court's finding that the draft was forwarded to Merchants Bank within a reasonable time, 
was not a question of law, but an unresolved question of fact. 136 Although the First Circuit 
did conclude that Flagship had "complied with the requirements of the letter of credit in 
every material respect,"137 because a question of fact was held to exist, the First Circuit 
vacated and remanded the district court summary judgment for Flagship. 
As regards the discrepancy between the naming of Flagship Cruises, Ltd. instead of 
Flagship as beneficiary, the First Circuit found that the required statement sent by 
Flagship to Chemical (and inadvertently omitted when documents were sent to Mer-
chants) made clear that an agent-principal relationship existed between the twO. 13S The 
First Circuit found compliance between the required references to Merchants and the 
number of the credit because it could not "see how the form actually used could be 
interpreted in any other way."139 On the misstatement by Flagship that the letter of credit 
rather than the draft was in conjunction with the Letter of Agreement and the Adden-
dum, the First Circuit viewed this as a case of the "greater including the smaller."14o They 
went on to note that, "we don't see this kind of interpretation as relaxing the strict 
construction approach to letters of credit, but rather as equating a literal requirement 
with its functional equal."141 
The First Circuit was clearly trying to protect Flagship's equitable right to payment 
under the letter of credit. Had the court held otherwise in regard to the discrepancies 
described above, Flagship's initial documentary demand for payment would have been 
130 ld. 
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nonconforming, and no bank would have been liable for payment. Flagship's only 
recourse would have been to file suit for payment against the bankrupt Chris Travel. 
Unfortunately, the First Circuit's "sacred cow of equity" has trampled the "tender vines" 
of letter of credit law by holding that documents which were almost, but not quite, the 
same, were sufficient. I42 
B. Fraud Under UCC § 5-114 and Case Law 
A bank's customer can only enjoin payment to a beneficiary who has made a conform-
ing demand under a letter of credit by showing that a fraud has been perpetrated. The 
doctrine was first developed in Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation, 143 and later 
codified in UCC § 5-114. The doctrine protects buyers from sellers who have committed a 
fraud in a letter of credit transaction, usually by shipping worthless goods or by present-
ing falsified documents. I44 Normally a buyer who believes the seller has committed a 
fraud must seek an injunction from the appropriate court. I45 The burden is on the buyer 
to substantiate his allegation of fraud according to the appropriate court's rules of 
injunctive relief. Generally stated, an injunction will be granted when: (1) irreparable 
harm is shown; (2) there is a likelihood of success on the merits; (3) there is a lack of any 
other legal remedy; (4) extraordinary circumstances exist, (5) the balance of hardships is 
decidedly in favor of the party seeking relief; and (6) the public interest would be served 
by issuing an injunction. The UCC does not state when an injunction should be issued, 
which has left the courts free to apply local standards of injunctive relief. I46 
The statute on fraud is an important exception to the general principle that letter of 
credit transactions should be scrutinized independently of the parties' obligations under 
the contract. I47 The statute allows the court to look to elements in the underlying contract 
to determine whether the beneficiary should be allowed to draw on the letter of credit. 148 
Without this exception the seller could, by presenting documents which conformed on 
their face to the requirements of the letter of credit, commit a fraud. A buyer could not 
legally stop a seller from committing the fraud and collecting the money. 
Under traditional letter of credit transactions, the determination of fraud is usually 
quite simple: if documents were forged showing that the goods were shipped when they 
were not, or if the goods shipped were worthless rubbish instead of what the buyer 
ordered, the seller has committed a fraud under § 5-114 of the UCC. The bank will be 
enjoined from making payment, and the letters of credit will be declared null and void. 
142 See Harfield, Code, Customs and Conscience in Letter-orCredit Law, 4 U.C.C.L.]. 7, 11 (1972). 
143 Sztejn v.]. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941). 
144 Even though the UCP does not cover allegations of fraud, most courts have found that 
§ 5-114 applies to letter of credit disputes even when the agreement specifies that the credit is 
governed by the UCP. This is so when the UCC § 5-114 has been adopted by the state in which the 
court sits, and the court reasons that there is no conflict between the UCP and the UCC on fraud. 
Therefore, the principles on fraud from the UCC or case law apply. 
145 An appropriate court is one which has both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdic-
tion over the party against whom the injunction is sought. 
146 Though there are some minor differences among the states on the requirements for 
injunctive relief, most, if not all of the 6 criteria listed above, are considered at some point by any 
court hearing arguments for equitable relief. 
147 Credits, by their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other contracts on which 
they may be based and banks are in no way concerned with or bound by such contracts. UCP supra 
note 8, at General Provision (C). 
148 UCC § 5-114(2)(b) supra note 8. 
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If the bank has already paid, while another bank or its customer could not, the bank 
might be left with only fraudulent documents. In this situation, the statute protects the 
bank. Section 5-114 (2) (a) requires an issuing bank to pay any holder in due course or any 
negotiating bankl49 which has made payment and has accepted the documents as con-
forming and paid.150 The questions then become when has a bank negotiated a letter of 
credit,I51 and is a confirming bank always a holder in due course?152 As will be seen in Part 
III, the latter question becomes particularly important when dealing with a contracting 
government or agency, and a confirming government bank in the same country.153 Under 
§ 3-302 of the UCC, a holder in due course must take the letter of credit for value, in good 
faith, and without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored. A holder in due course 
must also take the letter of credit without notice of any defense or claim to it by anyone 
else.154 
Greater problems arise when a standby letter of credit is involved. Because of the 
nature of the standby letter in international transactions, it is more difficult to apply the 
principles of fraud. As a result, it becomes more difficult to win injunctive relief.1 55 
1. Pre-Iranian Revolution Cases on Fraud 
Cases arising after the Iranian Revolution were the first to involve allegations of 
fraud under UCC § 5-114 in a number of different circumstances. ls6 U.S. corporations 
had millions of dollars in standbys which named Iranian government agencies as ben-
eficiaries. These corporations were worried that unauthorized people might make 
fraudulent demands on the standbys. Because the standbys required so few documents to 
make a conforming demand for payment, usually confirmed and paid by a central 
Iranian government bank, there was a very real danger that U.S. companies, through 
their banks, would be required to pay fraudulent demands. 
Cases decided before the Iranian Revolution illustrate the attitudes of courts faced 
with allegations of fraud where the plaintiffs seek to enjoin or force payment. Any 
discussion of fraud in relation to letters of credit must begin with Sztejn v. J. Henry 
Schroder Banking Corporation,ls7 which established the right to enjoin the payment of a 
fraudulent demand on a letter of credit. 
In Sztejn, the plaintiff, an American businessman, contracted to purchase bristles 
from Transea Traders, Ltd., an Indian corporation. lss The goods were to be paid for by a 
traditional letter of credit issued by Schroder Banking Corporation [Schroder], which 
required that a draft, bill of lading, and invoices be presented to the Chartered Bank of 
149 A negotiating bank is sometimes used to expedite payment. The negotiating bank is located 
in the same place as the beneficiary who sells the draft to the bank making it a holder in due course 
entitled to payment from an issuing or confirming bank upon presentation of the draft and any 
required accompanying documents. 
150 See VCC § 3-302 supra note 8; VCP, supra note 8 at Art. 3(b). 
151 Custom and usage in the banking industry allows up to three banking days or "reasonable 
time." This has been codified in § 5-112 of the VCC, supra note 8. See also, VCP supra note 8 at Art. 
8(d). 
15. See notes 121-129 and accompanying text. 
153 See notes 275-415 and accompanying text. 
154 VCC § 3-302 supra note 8. 
155 See notes 219-274 and accompanying text. 
156 See cases discussed in Part II.B.2. 
157 177 Mise. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941). 
158 177 Mise. at 720-721, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633. 
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India [Chartered], Schroder's correspondent bank. ls9 Chartered would then present the 
documents to Schroder for collection for the account of Transea.16o 
After Transea had presented conforming documents to Chartered, and before 
Schroder had accepted the documents and paid under the conforming demand, Sztejn 
sought an injunction to prevent Schroder from paying the amount due. Sztejn alleged 
that the documents were fraudulent because the bristles described in the documents were 
not shipped by the selier.161 Transea had instead shipped crates of worthless rubbish and 
cow hair in an attempt to defraud Sztejn and collect payment.162 
In granting the injunction and denying the Chartered Bank's motion to dismiss, the 
court first reaffirmed some of the principles of letter of credit law: "a letter of credit is 
independent of the primary contract of sale between the buyer and the seller."163 Banks 
deal in "documents, not goods,"164 and, conforming documents presented to a bank for 
payment must be honored.16s A bank which is a holder in due course cannot be denied 
payment by the issuing bank.166 The court then carved out an exception to these general 
principles by noting that the principles "presuppose that the documents accompanying 
the draft are genuine .... "167 The court pointed out that this case did not involve a mere 
breach of warranty where the goods were inferior; here, the seller intentionally failed to 
ship any goods ordered by the buyer. The court concluded that in "such a situation, 
where the seller's fraud has been called to the bank's attention before the drafts and 
documents have been presented for payment, the principle of the independence of the 
bank's obligation under the letter of credit should not be extended to protect the 
unscrupulous seller."168 The court made clear that if a bank has exercised reasonable 
diligence in determining whether the documents conform, and has paid under the letter 
of credit before receiving notice of fraud, the bank will be protected even though the 
documents are forged or fraudulent. 169 
Finally, the court stated that Chartered was not a holder in due course, but a "mere 
agent for collection for the account of the seller charged with fraud ... If it had appeared 
that [Chartered] bank ... was a holder in due course, its claim against the bank issuing the 
letter of credit would not be defeated even though the primary transaction was tainted 
with fraud."170 As stated earlier, the court based its decision on the fact that the docu-
ments presented were fraudulent and did not represent the goods for which the parties to 
the underlying transaction had contracted.17l Thus, although the Sztejn case supports the 
provisions in § 5-114 relating to fraudulent or forged documents, it is silent on what can 







165 177 Misc. at 721,31 N.Y.S.2d at 634. 
166 177 Mise. at 721, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 635. 
167 177 Misc. at 721,31 N.Y.S.2d at 634. 
168 177 Mise. at 721,31 N.Y.S.2d at 634. 
169 177 Mise. at 723,31 N.Y.S.2d at 635. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 There has been a continuing controversy over the question of which transactions fall within 
the scope of the statute. In their attempts to bring standby letters of credit within the scope of 
§ 5-114, some courts have recognized that the entire transaction can be so tainted with fraud as to 
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As Harfield points out, the statute expanded the scope of Sztejn by including the 
phrase "fraud in the transaction."'73 The Sztejn case was decided on the basis of clear 
proof that the documents were forged and fraudulently represented the contents of the 
crates shipped. 1 74 "Fraud in the transaction" leaves room for the courts to make an 
equitable determination and base it on a relatively vague phrase. Other cases have, 
however, helped to define this concept. 
In United Bank Limited v. Cambridge Sporting Goods, 175 the court suggested that "fraud 
in the transaction" comes into play when the contract for the underlying transaction has 
been legitimately cancelled. '76 Even though the underlying contract was cancelled, which 
required release of a letter of credit, the beneficiary still presented conforming docu-
ments for payment. '77 This is important to note because an otherwise casual reader might 
justifiably believe that the court based its determination of "fraud in the transaction" on 
the fact that the seller-beneficiary, Duke Sports, shipped old, mildewed boxing gloves 
instead of new gloves which were to have been manufactured according to the parties' 
agreement. The above situation fits the provisions in § 5-114 for the granting of an 
injunction when presented with forged or fraudulent documents: wh!le they conform to 
the letter of credit requirements, they do not represent the goods for which the buyer 
contracted. 
As noted by commentators, it would be redundant if "fraud in the transaction" meant 
the same thing as the presentation of forged or fraudulent documents. '78 The Cambridge 
case illustrates both possibilities under § 5-114 for enjoining payment of letters of credit: 
"fraud in the transaction" based on the fact that the contract was cancelled before a 
conforming demand was made,'79 and "forged or fraudulent documents" based on the 
fact that the documents showed that new boxing gloves had been shipped when only 
worthless old boxing gloves arrived. '80 
The court, perhaps mistakenly, viewed the situation from a different perspective: 
"[w]e hold upon the facts as established, that the shipment of old, unpadded, ripped and 
mildewed gloves ... constituted fraud in the transacti(;m within the meaning of subdivi-
sion (2) of section 5-114. It should be noted that the drafters of § 5-114, in their attempt to 
codify the Sztejn case and in utilizing the term 'fraud in the transaction,' have eschewed 
the dogmatic approach and adopted a flexible standard to be applied as circumstances of 
a particular situation mandate."'8' To conform to the reasoning of the Sztejn case, the 
court should have focused on the documents to see if they fraudulently misrepresented 
the goods shipped. Though the reasoning used may deserve equal credence, it is not the 
same. 
This case is in a different context from most letter of credit cases. Cambridge, the 
buyer, had already won a default judgment against Duke, the seller. A preliminary 
vitiate the obligations under a letter of credit. See Dynamics, 356 F. Supp. 991 (1973). Others argue 
that "in the transaction" refers to the letter of credit itself. See UCC § 5-114, Comment 1 supra note 8. 
173 HARFIELD, H., LETTERS OF CREDIT, Uniform Commercial Code/Practice Handbook, Amer-
ican Law Institute (1979) p. 84 [hereinafter cited as LETTERS OF CREDIT]. 
174 177 Mise. at 721,31 N.Y.S.2d at 633. 
175 41 N.Y.2d 254, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 360 N.E.2d 943 (1976). 
176 See supra note 172. 
177 41 N.Y.2d at 256, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 268,360 N.Y.2d at 946. 
178 See LETTERS OF CREDIT, supra note 173. 
179 41 N.Y.2d at 256, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 268, 360 N.E.2d at 946. 
]80 41 N.Y.2d at 260, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 271, 360 N.E.2d at 949. 
181 41 N.Y.2d at 260, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 271, 360 N.E.2d at 949. 
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injunction was granted which prohibited the issuing bank, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 
from paying any drafts drawn under the letter of credit.182 Though the decision to issue 
the injunction was clearly based on § 5-114, it is not clear on which of the two possible 
frauds the court's decision was based. 
The Cambridge case was instituted by two Pakistani banks, United Bank, Ltd. and the 
Muslim Commercial Bank, in the seller's country, which had allegedly financed the sale 
and had originally requested the issuance of the letter of credit for the amount of the 
contract price from Hanover Trust.183 After the letter of credit had been issued, Duke 
informed Cambridge that it would be impossible to meet the time limit for manufacture 
and delivery as required by the contract, and requested an extension of the time for 
performance. Cambridge replied that, due to resale committments, it could not agree to 
any extension.ls4 Cambridge then advised Duke that the contract was cancelled and that 
the letter of credit should be released. ls5 Cambridge, at the same time, notified United 
Bank that the contract had been cancelled.186 
Despite the cancellation and notice, almost a month later, Hanover Trust informed 
Cambridge that it had received a draft and the required documents from United, 
allegedly showing the shipment of the boxing gloves under the terms of the cancelled 
contract. IS7 The draft was drawn by Duke upon Hanover Trust and made payable to 
United for the amount of one-half of the letter of credit.lss A month later Hanover Trust 
received similar documents from the Muslim Bank, the draft made payable to it, request-
ing payment of the other half of the letter of credit. ls9 
The Pakistani banks brought this action claiming their right to payment as holders in 
due course. They claimed they were entitled to payment, despite any defenses that 
Cambridge may have had against Duke.190 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's 
directed verdict and the appellate division's affirmation, holding that the defense of fraud 
in the transaction was established and in that circumstance the burden shifted to petition-
ers to prove that they were holders in due course, that they took the drafts for value, in 
good faith, and without notice of any fraud on the part of Duke.191 The court, citing 
Banco Espagno[192 went on to say that, "in the context of a letter of credit transaction and, 
specifically subdivision (2) of section 5-114, it is these defenses which operate to shift the 
burden of proof of holder in due course status upon one asserting such status."193 
In Intraworld Industries, Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 194 a standby letter of credit was set up 
by a lessee. The standby was payable to the lessor if the lessee failed to pay rent on a Swiss 
hotel according to a certain payment plan. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to 
grant an injunction despite the lessee's allegations of fraud in the underlying transac-
tion.195 The lessee argued that the lease had been cancelled and rent, therefore, was not 








190 41 N.Y.2d at 257, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 269, 360 N.E. at 947. 
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192 Banco Espagnol, 385 F.2d 230 (1967). 
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due. 196 The lessee further argued that the demand was fraudulent because it was not for 
rent due, as stated in the documents, but for a stipulated penalty pursuant to an adden-
dum of the lease.197 
In denying the injunction, the court noted that, 
[i]n light of the basic rule of the independence of the issuer's engagement and 
the importance of this rule to the effectuation of the purposes of the letter of 
credit, we think that the circumstances which will justify an injunction must be 
narrowly limited to situations of fraud in which the wrongdoing of the 
beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes 
of the independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer be served. 198 
The court then concluded that, "if the documents presented by [the lessor] are 
genuine in the sense of having some basis in fact, an injunction must be refused. An 
injunction is proper only if [the lessor], comparable to the beneficiary in Sztejn, has no 
bona fide claim to payment under the lease."199 
The decision seems to be based on facts showing that the lessee had failed to pay rent 
and other operating bills of the hotel in excess of $100,000. In addition, the lessee had 
violated Swiss law by failing to complete the board of directors of its Swiss subsidiary and 
had refused to account to the lessor for the difficulties and apparent mismanagement.2oo 
The facts were sufficient for the court to find that the documents had some basis in fact 
and that the lessor might have a bona fide claim.201 
As support for its decisions, the court cited Dynamics Corporation of America v. Citizens 
and Southern National Bank, which involved a standby letter of credit naming the govern-
ment of India as beneficiary.202 This case bears several similarities to the Iranian cases: the 
letter of credit was called upon as a result of political disturbance surrounding the 
emergence of Bangladesh as a nation. The Indian aggression resulted in a U.S. ban on the 
export of the goods produced by Dynamics for India.203 
In this case, Dynamics contracted to sell defense-related communications equipment 
to the government of India.204 The Agreement obligated Dynamics to manufacture the 
equipment, deliver it "F.O.B. its plant,"20S and to provide technical assistance to India to 
ensure the equipment's proper use. Under the contract, Dynamics was required to secure 
good performance of its obligations with a standby letter of credit which required only a 
draft and certification by the President of India that Dynamics had "failed to carry out 
certain obligations of theirs under the said Order/ Agreement.''206 When war erupted 
between India and Pakistan, the U.S. barred shipment of the goods.207 When the Indian 
government failed to make payment against Dynamics' invoices, Dynamics was forced 
196 461 Pa. at 359, 336 A.2d at 324. 
197 [d. 
198 [d. 
199 461 Pa. at 361, 336 A.2d at 325. 
200 461 Pa. at 351, 336 A.2d at 320. 
201 See 461 Pa. at 361, 336 A.2d at 325. 
202 356 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Georgia 1973). 
203 356 F. Supp. at 993, 994. 
204 356 F. Supp. at 993. 
205 356 F. Supp. at 996. 
206 356 F. Supp. at 994 n. 2. 
207 356 F. Supp. at 994. 
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into bankruptcy.208 Two months after filing for bankruptcy, and two days before the 
letter of credit was due to expire, India presented a sight draft to the issuing bank with the 
required certification that Dynamics had failed to carry out their obligations under the 
contract.209 Fortunately for the bank, Dynamics had already gotten a temporary restrain-
ing order against the bank paying any demand on the standby.2lO 
Dynamics based its allegations of fraud on the contract provision which obligated it to 
supply the equipment F.O.B. its plant, which they had done.211 In other words, it ~as 
India's responsibility to get the goods to their country, not Dynamics'. Dynamics had 
therefore performed, and India's certification to the contrary was fraudulent. 212 
In support of its decision to issue a preliminary injunction as sought by Dynamics, the 
court noted that, "[t]he law of 'fraud' is not static and the courts have, over the years, 
adapted it to the changing nature of commercial transactions in our society."213 As a 
caveat to their decision, the court made clear that, 
"Since ... this court has no business making an ultimate adjudication regard-
ing compliance with the provisions of the underlying sales agreement, India 
will not be required to prove that [Dynamics] 'failed to carry out certain 
obligations of theirs' under the Agreement in order to get payment from the 
Bank. Rather, the court views its task in this case as merely guaranteeing that 
India not be allowed to take unconscientious advantage of the situation and 
run off with plaintiff's money on a pro forma declaration which has abso-
lutely no basis in fact. If it should turn out that there is a legal and factual basis 
for India's certification, the court will leave the plaintiff to its remedy at 
law."214 
This case clearly runs counter to the decisions in Intraworld Industries 215 and Bossier 
Bank and Trust Co. v. Union Planters National Bank of Memphis ,216 but it is questionable 
whether a case allowing a preliminary injunction should be considered as precedent in a 
case seeking a permanent injunction. While a preliminary injunction preserves the status 
quo,217 a permanent injunction is an equitable remedy. It is granted when the court is 
faced with extraordinary circumstances and no other remedy at law. It is important to 
note here that a standby letter of credit often has no relation to the total contract price in 
international transactions other than as a percentage,218 or an invoice amount as in this 
case. Therefore, it does not matter how much, if any, of the contract price should be 
allocated to the contract provision requiring Dynamics to provide technical assistance. It 
was a "certain condition" to the contract, as stipulated in the letter of credit. Considering 
this line of argument, a preliminary injunction should not even have been issued, despite 
208 356 F. Supp. at 995. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 356 F. Supp. at 996. 
212 Id. 
213 356 F. Supp. at 998. 
214 356 F. Supp. at 999; remedy would be binding arbitration in India. 
215 461 Pa. 343, 336 A.2d. 316. 
216 Bossier Bank and Trust v. Union Planters National Bank, 550 F.2d 1077 (6th Cir. 1977). 
217 This is at least the perspective from which the court in the Dynamics case viewed preliminary 
injunctive relief. The court then noted the factors to be considered: importance of the rights 
asserted, nature of acts to be enjoined, hardships if the injunction is granted or denied, likelihood of 
success on the merits, and public interest. 356 F. Supp. at 999. 
218 See notes 280-295 and accompanying text. 
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the status quo reasoning of the court. India had complied with the terms of an outstand-
ing letter of credit, and it was clear on the facts that Dynamics could not perform. Thus, 
under the terms of the credit, India had a right to call on the standby. 
2. Allegations of Fraud in the Iranian Cases 
The standby letter of credit cases which arose after the Iranian Revolution are 
important because of the novel arguments advanced in favor of injunctions. U.S. com-
panies which had the standbys issued naming the Iranian government or one of its 
agencies as beneficiary, had assumed the good faith of the Shah's pro-American govern-
ment. Because of the Shah's good faith and Iran's superior bargaining power due to the 
heavy competition for contracts, the standbys required few, if any, documents for a 
conforming demand requiring payment.219 Thus, once the anti-American Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran came to power, the standbys became weapons in the hands of a legitimate but 
unfriendly State successor to the Imperial Government. 
Although the injunction suits were brought before demands had been made on the 
standbys, it was clear to those involved that such demands were very likely. The standbys 
were susceptable to conforming, though perhaps arbitrary or fraudulent, demands. In 
view of the Islamic Republic's well-publicized hatred for the United States, what better 
way to disrupt American business than to repudiate all contracts and then to make 
conforming demands on all available standby letters of credit still outstanding, regardless 
of whether or not the demands were legitimate? 
There is no definitive system used in presenting these arguments.220 Some authors 
base their discussion on the stage of completion of the contracts,221 others on the type of 
injunctive relief awarded,222 if any. Others discuss the novelty of the arguments and their 
future utility.223 This section will combine these approaches while focusing on the prece-
dential value of these arguments in future letter of credit controversies. 
a. Nonconformity of Demand - the Wrong Sovereign Beneficiary Claim 
The claim that the new sovereign is an illegitimate beneficiary is perhaps the best 
losing argument asserted in many of the Iranian cases. The principle is supported in both 
the UCC224 and the UCP,225 which agree that the beneficiary's right to demand payment 
on a letter of credit is not assignable,228 unless the letter of credit so provides or the parties 
agree. It is therefore argued that without the consent of the bank's customer, the Islamic 
219 See notes 325-363 and accompanying text. 
220 Getz, Enjoining the International Standby Letter of Credit: The Iranian Letter of Credit Cases, 21 
HARV. INT'L L. J. 189 (1980); Weisz and Blackman, Standby Letter of Credit After Iran: Remedies Of the 
Account Party, 1982 V. ILL. L. REv. 355 [hereinafter cited as Remedies Of the Account Party]; Note, 
"Fraud In The Transaction"; Enjoining Letttrs Of Credit During The Iranian Revolution, 93 HARV. L. REv. 
992 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Enjoining the Standby]; Note, The Role Of Standby Letter Of Credit In 
International Commerce: Reflections After Iran, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 459 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
Reflections After Iran]. 
221 Fraud in the Transaction, supra, note 220. 
222 Enjoining The Standby, supra, note 220. 
223 Remedies of the Account Party, supra, note 220; Reflections After Iran, supra, note 220. 
224 VCC § 5-116(1), supra note 8. 
225 VCP supra, note 8 at Art. 46(d). 
226 It is important to understand that the beneficiary may assign his right to payment, but he 
may not assign his right to make the demand for payment. 
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Republic of Iran or one of its agencies, substituted itself as beneficiary in place of the 
Imperial Government of Iran. This would be a violation of letter of credit law, thus 
entitling the account party to the injunctive relief sought. Such an assertion is further 
supported by the doctrine of strict conformity which requires strict compliance with the 
terms of the credit, including the name of the beneficiary.227 
The doctrine of state succession, however, conflicts with the non-assignability of 
letters of credit and the strict conformity doctrine. The doctrine of state succession holds 
that when the new government of a State is recognized, it succeeds to all the contractual 
rights and obligations of the old government.228 Without fail, the courts rejected non-
assignability and strict conformity and accepted the doctrine of state succession.229 
b. Anticipatory Fraud - Demands by Parties with Unauthorized Access to Bank 
Records and Telex Machines 
Anticipatory fraud was argued by parties on whom no demand had yet been made, 
but who believed that anti-American revolutionary forces could gain unauthorized access 
to bank records and bank telexes. Such an assertion, although based on allegations of 
fraud, was not without some basis in fact. It would have been very easy for revolutionary 
forces to assume that the Iranian banks were hotbeds of capitalist, pro-American sym-
pathizers. In the Werner Lehara230 case, the plaintiff, in its effort to enjoin payment of a 
letter of credit, alleged that the responsible official "was in the process of issuing the final 
written preliminary acceptance when he was arrested by armed revolutionary forces."231 
The courts in rejecting such claims of anticipatory fraud, looked to the elements 
which would justify granting a preliminary injunction. They concluded that such allega-
tions were too speculative to reach the threshold of irreparable harm.232 Nevertheless, 
this argument convinced the courts to grant notice injunctions of three, ten, fifteen or 
twenty days.233 These injunctions required the bank to give notice to the U.S. company 
that the bank had received a conforming demand on a standby. The injunctions also 
required the banks not to pay on demand until the customer could determine the 
authenticity of the demand.234 If the customer could gather enough facts in the time 
alloted to show that the demand had been made by unauthorized persons, the court 
might be persuaded to grant an injunction. 
227 See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1977); Courtaulds North 
America, Inc. v. North Carolina National Bank, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975). 
228 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 120 (1938); REsTATEMENT (SECOND), 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 107 comment (c) (1965). 
229 Obviously, such an approach in no way affects the letter of credit laws as they apply to 
non-governmental beneficiaries. 
230 Werner Lehera International, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. 
Mich. 1980). 
231 484 F. Supp. 65. 
232 See KMW International v. Chase Manhattan, 606 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1979). 
233 Werner Lehera, supra, n. 2·30 (3 day notice injunction granted; preliminary injunction de-
nied); KMW International v. Chase Manhattan, 606 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979) (injunction vacated; 3 
day notice injunction granted); Harris Int'l Telecommunications v. Bank Melli Iran, 79 Civ. 802 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1979) (10 day notice injunction granted); Stromberg-Carlson Corp. v. Bank Melli 
Iran, 467 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (10 day notice injunction granted); CBA Int'l Dev. Corp. v. 
European Am. Bank & Trust, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 1979, at 6. Col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (15 day notice 
granted); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Bank Melli Iran, No. 79-1190 (S.D.N .Y. Apr. 3, 1979) (20 
day notice injunction against Bank Melli paying under its guarantees). 
234 See cases cited in note 233, supra .. 
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Recognizing that the notice injunctions effectively added a provision to the terms of 
the standbys without the consent of all parties, the courts pointed out that the time delay 
was consistent with the reasonable time period allowed by both the UCC235 and the 
UCP.236 Because of the extraordinary circumstances in Iran, such notice injunctions 
merely allowed for a sufficient time period to verify a demand. The use of notice 
injunctions was also supported by the principle of letter of credit law which holds that 
conforming documents must be genuine to entitle the beneficiary to payment.237 
Plaintiffs in similar situations who were denied notice injunctions found themselves 
in a quagmire when conforming documents had been submitted and payment made. The 
plaintiffs' cases would be moot by the time they were ripe.238 By then, their only method 
of repayment would be on the contract, against Iranian sovereign beneficiaries. In the 
Iranian courts,239 the chances of a successful outcome would have been slim; they could 
also have been subjected to counter-claims for crimes against the Iranian people.240 
c. Politically Motivated Demands 
Many believe that the granting of a preliminary injunction in the Dynamics241 case can 
be used as precedent to justify injunctions when a sovereign beneficiary makes an 
arbitrary demand based on political motivations.242 The court in the American Bell243 case 
recognized such a possibility, but placed the burden of proof on the customer to show that 
the demand was politically motivated and not based on commercial or economic consid-
erations.244 Even where the customer is able to show political motivation, the beneficiary 
still has the power to dissolve the injunction if it can show some economic or commercial 
basis in fact for the demand.245 
Thus, although the claim is available to those seeking injunctions, the burden of 
proof is very high where facts, by the nature of the situation, are scarce. The beneficiary 
may easily, perhaps even fraudulently, rebut the assertion. 
d. Conflict and Precedent Surrounding Allegations of Political Turmoil as the 
Equivalent of Fraud 
Two cases decided by the New York Supreme Court in 1941 established conflicting 
precedents regarding political turmoil which threatened to frnstrate international trans-
actions. The question was whether political turmoil could be viewed as the equivalent of 
fraud for purposes of seeking an injunction against facially conforming demands. Both 
235 UCC § 5-112, supra note 8. 
236 UCP supra note 8 at Art. 8(d). 
237 See Sztejn supra n. 143 at 634. 
23" Enjoining the Standby, supra note 220, at 218 and accompanying notes. 
239 Most, if not all, of the contracts with the Iranian Government, required that disputes on the 
contract be settled according to Iranian law and in the Iranian colirt system. 
240 This is not so far fetched when one considers the animosity against the United States 
displayed by the Islamic Republic during the Hostage Crisis and the accusations made suggesting 
criminal conduct in the activities between the Shah and the American companies. 
241 Dynamics, 356 F. Supp. 991. 
242 Id. 
243 American Bell International v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
244 474 F. Supp. at 425. 
245 Dynamics, 356 F. Supp. at 999. 
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Grob v. Manufacturers Trust CO.246 and Nadler v. Mei Loong Corporation of China 247 involved 
traditional letters of credit. 
In Grob, the buyer-customer had arranged to have Japanese ships pick up and deliver 
the goods.248 The buyer's bank would make payments under the letter of credit against 
bills of lading submitted by the Chinese seller.249 The buyer alleged that, considering the 
major political upheaval caused by the Japanese in the Pacific, the Japanese ships would 
issue the required bills of lading and then never deliver the goods.250 In denying the 
motion for injunction, the Grob court held that to do otherwise "would be nothing other 
than shifting to the sellers or the defendant [issuer bank] risks which the plaintiff has 
contracted to assume."251 
Only a month later, the same court granted an injunction in Nadler252 based on facts 
similar to Grob. The only apparent difference was that by this time the Japanese had 
invaded China.253 Thus, Nadler held that "these are extraordinary times in which ordi-
nary business standards and strict legal rules must be examined specially and perhaps 
disregarded in the interests of justice and equity."254 
Unfortunately for customers seeking injunctions, the Second Circuit, in KMW Inter-
national v. Chase Manhattan Bank,255 held that Grob controlled. The court rejected the idea 
that political turmoil is the equivalent of fraud for purposes of granting an injunction.256 
Because the customers had subjected themselves to the risks and hazards of doing 
business in foreign countries, the court held that shifting those risks was unwarranted.257 
Once again, a U.S. court had adhered to legal rules in letter of credit law and rejected a 
claim for equitable relief. 
e. Impossibility of Performance as a Basis for Asserting Fraud in the Transaction 
In the KMW case, the lower court accepted the argument that impossibility could 
justify an injunction. The court held that a letter of credit should not be honored "where 
there is a considerable danger that the transaction will be frustrated by . . . fraud, 
supervening illegality, insurrection, or war."258 The Second Circuit reversed, finding 
nothing in letter of credit law "which excuses an issuing bank from paying a letter of 
credit because of supervening illegality, impossibility, war, or insurrection."259 Clearly, 
the more one looks at these arguments, the more one wonders when an injunction in a 
close case should issue under a court's equitable powers. In any event the argument failed, 
though Nadler was not specifically overruled, and the court closed one more door to 
equitable relief in letter of credit controversies. 
246 177 Misc. 45, 29 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. 1941). 
247 177 Misc. 263, 30 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1941). 
248 177 Misc. at 45,29 N.Y.S.2d at 916. 
249 [d. 
250 Id. 
251 177 Misc. at 45, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 916. 
252 177 Mise. at 265, 30 N.Y.S.2d at 324. 
253 See Reflections After Iran, supra, note 220 at 487. 
254 177 Mise. at 264, 30 N.Y.S.2d at 324. 
255 606 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979). 
256 606 F.2d at 16. 
257 606 F.2d at 17. 
258 No. 79-1067 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1979), a/I'd on rehearing (Mar. 16, 1979) Slip Op. at 21. 
259 606 F .2d at 16. 
248 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:221 
f. Foreign Court Decisions in the Iranian Cases as Support for the Fraud Argument 
Some customers in their briefs seeking injunctive relief cited several European cases, 
which, though not subject to the UCC, held that arbitrary or fraudulent demands justified 
relief. In Collins Systems International, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank and Bank Mallat, the 
Parisian Court of Commerce held that a demand on a standby was fraudulent and 
abusive.260 In Fortres-Icas Continental Associates v. Alqemene Bank Nederland N. V., the District 
Court of Amsterdam held that a demand was fraudulent and arbitrary.261 In A If a-Laval 
AB v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Bank v. Bank Melli and Iran Dairy Industries 
Co., the Commercial Court of Brussels held that a demand was abusive and in bad faith. 262 
Though it is not clear whether U.S. courts give any credence to these decisions, it is 
certainly worthwhile to consider them. From the banks' perspective, the more injunctions 
that are granted, the less the banks' reputations will suffer in international commerce, and 
the better off their customers seeking equitable relief will be. 
g. International Law in Support of Injunctive Relief 
One author artfully argues that a court could issue an injunction based on fraud 
when the customer's ability to challenge retention of the money paid under a letter to a 
sovereign beneficiary has been effectively eliminated.263 This could occur either because 
of a change in the municipal law of the country in which the customer must bring his 
claim, or because of an effective denial of access to those courts in which the parties to the 
contract have agreed to settle their disputes. The argument is: 
A party contracting with a foreign sovereign has the right, under interna-
tional law, to the protection of the laws of the sovereign at the time of 
contracting. Accordingly, if a sovereign attempts to draw upon an uncondi-
tiona I letter of credit when it is in breach of its state responsibilities to an alien 
contracting party, then payment on the demand is not within the risks allo-
cated to the alien party by the letter of credit terms. In such a case, the 
expectations of the parties would only be effectuated by a decision granting 
injunctive relief.264 
According to this line of reasoning, U.S. companies must have an effective opportunity to 
pursue the remedies under Iranian law as it existed at the time of contracting. Obviously, 
that opportunity did not exist at the time the Iranian cases were brought before the U.S. 
courts. 
h. Satisfying the Elements of Injunctive Relief 
Many of the arguments discussed above were made in an effort to satisfy one or more 
of the elements of injunctive relief. If any lesson is to be learned from the courts' decisions 
in the Iranian cases, it is that the standards are very high, and the burden of proof 
decidedly heavy on the bank's customer. He must show that the elements of injunctive 
relief are thoroughly proved in his favor, thus justifying relief. Perhaps the greatest 
difficulty faced by the U.S. companies in these cases was the gathering of facts in support 
of their assertions. 
260 Court of Commerce of Paris (Feb. 12, 1982). 
261 Case No. KG80/1065 District Court of Amsterdam. 
262 Case No. 2920, Commercial Court of Brussels (April 6, 1982). 
263 Enjoining the Standby, supra, note 220 at 242. 
264 Id. at 243. 
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When no demand on a standby had been made, the courts held that the likelihood of 
irreparable harm was too speculative.265 At best, the courts granted the plaintiff a notice 
injunction. If a demand had been made, the task was slightly easier: the bank's customer 
needed to show that the forum in which he would be required to recover the money on 
the contract would no longer be available. At the very least, he would have to show that 
the foreign courts were unlikely to adhere to notions of fair play and due process.266 
The "lack of any other legal remedy" criteria can be argued in much the same way as 
irreparable harm. Some courts, however, could not be persuaded and held, as they did in 
Werner Lehara267 that, "[s]hould Harris [the issuing bank], upon demand, make payment 
to Bank Melli in violation of the letter of credit, no question exists that money damages 
from Harris could be awarded."268 Though this is true, Werner Lehara, like many other 
customers in these cases, was not concerned that Harris would make a payment in 
violation of letter of credit law. Rather, Werner Lehara was concerned that Bank Melli 
would arbitrarily or fraudulently demand payment with conforming documents. Harris 
would inspect the documents, find them conforming, and pay; Werner Lehara would owe 
Harris the amount paid under the letter of credit, regardless of whether or not the 
demand had been legitimate. It is interesting to note that the principal potential perpe-
trator of fraud in the Iranian cases was seldom, if ever, a defendant. This was the 
sovereign beneficiary under the letters of credit. 
Compared to the beneficiaries of the standbys, who merely had to make a conform-
ing demand for payment and then force the customer to litigate in Iranian courts, the 
customers had the balance of hardships clearly tipped in their favor. Most courts, how-
ever, did not view the situation in this way: they considered the balance of hardships to be 
between the customer and the issuing bank.269 From this perspective, the banks in many 
cases were able to convince the courts that the balance of hardships tipped considerably in 
their favor. The banks' winning arguments included: (1) damage to their credibility in 
international commerce if they were unable to pay on irrevokable letters of credit,270 (2) 
the potential for retaliatory action against the banks' assets in Iran, including nationaliza-
tion and attachment,271 and (3) a shifting of risks which goes against the contract principle 
that as between two innocents, the party who undertakes the risks by contract "must bear 
the consequences when the risk comes home to rooSt."272 Though this is certainly a 
credible axiom when considered with the banks' other contentions, at least one commen-
tator has noted that if the Islamic Republic wanted, it could take retaliatory action against 
the banks based on false charges or for no reason at all.273 In addition, as several courts 
have noted, there is as much interest in discouraging fraud as there is in preserving the 
independence of/etters of credit.274 Not only does this suggest that banks e~oined should 
265 See cases cited, supra, note 233. 
266 Though several account parties were able to show this element of injunctive relief, their 
failure (according to the courts) to satisfy other elements of injunctive relief made the showing an 
empty victory. 
267 484 F. Supp. at 65. 
268 484 F. Supp. at 74. 
269 See Chase, supra, n. 227, Werner Lehera, supra, note 230. 
270 See KMW, 606 F.2d at 17; American Bell, 474 F. Supp. at 426. 
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not suffer any loss of reputation, but it also suggests a public interest in courts properly 
adjudicating the conflict between the two principles. 
With reference to the probability of success on the merits, there were no clear lines 
drawn by the courts, principally because there were very few identical sets of facts in the 
Iranian cases. The courts did, however, make use of the fraud exception and looked to 
aspects of the underlying contract and its performance. 
III. THE ITEK CASE 
The Itek case is the only U.S. case in which a permanent injunction was granted at the 
district court level. A U.S. bank was enjoined from honoring a demand for payment by an 
Iranian bank under standby letters of credit held for the benefit of an Iranian govern-
ment agency.275 
The case exemplifies the varied and complex problems faced by the parties to the suit 
and the court. Though some of the problems are limited to the particular and somewhat 
peculiar aspects of the Iranian revolution, the taking of American hostages and the U.S. 
response, the problems which this article addresses are relevant to most standby letter of 
credit transactions. Those problems discussed in Part II, which are relevant here are 
nonconformity of documentary demands, fraud in the transaction and its relationship to 
contract interpretation of the force majeure provisions, relationships between govern-
ment entities in foreign countries, and indispensable parties in letter of credit disputes. In 
addition, the difference between defenses to suits for breach of contract based on 
impossibility, acts of state, and substantial performance, as opposed to affirmative asser-
tions seeking injunctive relief from payments of standby letters of credit based on similar 
claims are important. 
The district court's decision in the Itek case has been appealed to the First Circuit by 
both the defendants, First National Bank of Boston and Bank Melli Iran, and was argued 
orally in the First Circuit on December 9, 1982.276 Because of the appeal, the facts of the 
case and the analyses which follows are drawn from the briefs and affidavits of the three 
parties to the appeal and from the district court's opinion.277 The facts presented will be 
those pertinent to the merits of the case.27B 
A. Statement of Facts 
In April 1977, Itek, an American corporation, entered into a contract with the 
Imperial Government of Iran for the manufacture of high-technology optical equipment 
275 Itek Corporation v. First National Bank of Boston, No. 80-58 Slip opinion (D. Mass., May 25, 
1982). This case will remain the only one in which a permanent injunction was granted of the district 
court level because the laws applicable to the Iranian litigation have changed. 
276 Itek Corporation v. First National Bank of Boston and Bank Melli Iran, Nos. 82-1632, 
82-1633 (1st CiT. March 29, 1983). 
277 No. 80-58 Slip opinion (D. Mass. May 25,1982); Itek v. First National Bank of Boston, 511 F. 
Supp. 1341 (D. Mass. 1981) (preliminary injunction granted); Brief for Appellant, Bank Melli Itek 
Corporation v. First National Bank of Boston, Nos. 82-1632, 82-1633 (1st Cir. 1982); Brief for 
Appellant, First National Bank of Boston, Nos. 82-1632, 82-1633 (1st Cir. 1982); Brieffor Appellee, 
Itek Corporation Nos. 82-1632, 82-1633 (1st Cir. 1982). 
278 The many procedural problems related to Executive orders, the Hostage Settlement 
Agreement, Treasury Regulations, and amendments to Treasury Regulations, will be omitted. 
Though the 1st Circuit based its decision to vacate the injunction on procedural aspects, it is 
necessary to approach the discussion in this way to avoid confusion and complex constitutional issues 
beyond the scope of this article. 
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at the agreed price of $22,500,000.279 The contract required Itek to furnish the Imperial 
Government with four bank guarantees, each in the amount of $1,125,000, issued by an 
Iranian bank naming the Ministry of War as beneficiary.280 The guarantees were in-
tended to secure Itek's repayment of an advance payment by the Imperial Government of 
$4,500,000 (twenty percent of the contract price), in the event of premature termination 
of the contract.281 The contract also required Itek to furnish another bank guarantee in 
the amount of $2,250,000, issued by an Iranian bank and naming the Ministry of War as 
beneficiary.282 Its purpose was to secure Itek's good performance of its contractual 
obligations.283 
Itek set up these guarantees through Bank Melli, a wholly owned instrumentality of 
the Imperial Government.284 Bank Melli agreed to the arrangement but required Itek to 
furnish standby letters of credit in Bank Melli's favor, issued by an American bank with 
terms and amounts identical to the guarantees issued by Bank Melli.285 Itek set up this 
back-to-back credit arrangement through the First National Bank of Boston (FNBB) by 
procuring five standby letters of credit, for the same amounts as the guarantees, each 
naming Bank Melli as beneficiary.286 
The standby letters of credit issued by FNBB each required the following documents 
as a condition to their payment to Bank Melli: an authenticated cable stating that Bank 
Melli had been required by the Ministry of War to make payment under its corresponding 
guarantee and a notice that Bank Melli was airmailing to FNBB a signed statement that it 
had been required to pay.287 
The standby letters of credit and guarantees issued in lieu of the advance payment 
made by the Imperial Government had extendable expiration dates and were to be 
discounted as Itek submitted invoices showing completed work under the contract.288 
Thus, by the time Itek commenced this action on January 9, 1980, two of the four letters 
of credit had been discounted or expired, a third had been discounted to $70,753, and the 
fourth remained $1,125,000 for a total of $1,195,753.289 These two advance payment 
letters of credit had extended expiration dates (allowed under the contract) of April 14 
and 17, 1980.290 
The standby letter of credit and its corresponding guarantee, issued as a good 
performance guarantee, were required to equal ten percent of the total contract price, 
$2,250,000.291 The standby letter of credit had an expiration date of February 15, 1981, 
but, under the contract, was required to remain in effect until four weeks after the last 
final acceptance.292 The contract provided that final acceptance would occur one year 
after all equipment had been delivered, tested, and accepted.293 In other words, this 
279 511 F. Supp. at 1342. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
282 511 F. Supp. at 1343. 
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standby letter of credit from the FNBB and its companion bank guarantee from Bank 
Melli were issued as a warranty that the goods would perform as expected and be of the 
quality required under the contract. 
Provisions of the contract between Itek and the Imperial Government provided that 
in the event of force majeure, including the cancellation of the United States export 
license which would make shipment of the goods impossible, either party was entitled to 
inform the other that force majeure had occurred. After three months, the contract could 
be cancelled by written notice.294 The contract further provided that if the contract were 
cancelled, the parties would clear their account and release all guarantees and standby 
letters of credit. 295 
Once the contract was executed and all the guarantees and standby letters of credit 
were secured, Itek proceeded to perform its obligations under the contract.296 By Feb-
ruary 10, 1979, Itek's performance was ahead of schedule, and the value of its work 
completed amounted to $20,300,000.297 Of this amount, Itek had been paid $11,100,000, 
including the $4,500,000 of the down payment on which two of the advance payment 
letters of credit were still outstanding.29B During this time the Iranian revolution took 
place causing the downfall of the Imperial Government and the exile of the Shah.299 The 
successor to the Shah was Ayatollah Khomeini who abolished the Imperial Government 
and created the Islamic Republic of Iran.30o In addition, the Ministry of War (the original 
beneficiary under the guarantees) was abolished, and in its place, the Ministry of National 
Defense was created.30 ! 
On April 30, 1979, the State Department cancelled the export license for the equip-
ment produced under the contract between Itek and the Imperial Government. The 
cancellation allowed Itek to invoke the force majeure provisions of the contract which it 
first did on May 15, 1979.302 
Following the seizure of the American Embassy in Iran on November 3, 1979, 
President Carter declared a national emergency and, by Executive Order Number 12170, 
blocked all Iranian assets.303 This began a lengthy and complicated progression of 
Executive Orders, Treasury Regulations implementing the orders, the Hostage Agree-
ment, more Executive Orders, Treasury Regulations, and amendments to Treasury 
Regulations. All of these formed the core of FNBB's main argument that the judgment in 
the district court should be vacated because the Regulations had changed the applicable 
law.304 FNBB's main argument did not relate to standby letters of credit and, though 
worthy of academic discussion, is beyond the scope of this article. 
On Janaury 9, 1980, prior to any demand by Bank Melli for payment, Itek filed its 
complaint in this action against FNBB. The complaint sought injunctive relief against the 
payment by FNBB of any demand on all outstanding letters of credit related to the 
294 Brief for Appellee at 10. 
295 Brief for Appellee at 10, II. 
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contract between Itek and the government of Iran.30s In its complaint, Itek claimed that it 
was highly likely that persons in Iran with access to relevant bank records would fraudu-
lently demand payment from FNBB on the outstanding standby letters of credit.306 On 
the same day, the district court temporarily restrained the FNBB from honoring any 
demand without first giving Itek three days' notice.307 After a hearing, the district court 
issued a preliminary injunction to the same effect on January 18, 1980.308 
In February and March of 1980, Bank Melli telexed to FNBB requesting extensions 
on the two outstanding letters of credit corresponding to Bank Melli's bank guarantees of 
the down payment.309 In the alternative, Bank Melli requested payment in full of the 
outstanding amounts.3IO Standing by themselves, these telexes might have been legitimate 
under the contract.3ll However, because Itek already believed that the contract had been 
cancelled because of force majeure, and because they had informed the Ministry of 
Defense in May and December, 1979, after Itek had presented all invoices and a summary 
of the account to the Ministry, Itek refused to grant the extensions. Itek claimed that the 
letters of credit should have been released no later than four weeks after clearance of the 
down payment.312 Itek asserted that this occurred in August when they presented the 
Ministry of Defense with the unpaid invoices.313 In addition, on March 7, 1980, Itek again 
sent written notice to the Ministry of Defense cancelling the contract and demanding 
release of all bank guarantees and letters of credit under the applicable provisions of the 
contract.314 
These events prompted Itek to amend its complaint showing the new developments 
and to ask again for temporary relief, which was granted on March 11, 1980.31S The new 
restraining order enjoined FNBB from honoring any demand on the outstanding letters 
of credit.316 
On March 16, 1980, Bank Melli, by telex to FNBB, formally demanded payment of 
all outstanding letters of credit.317 This is the demand later found by the district court to 
be nonconforming.318 On March 19, 1980, Itek again amended its complaint adding 
Bank Melli as a defendant. Itek did not, h9wever, name the Ministry of Defense as a 
defendent, the party which allegedly had fraudulently received payment under the 
guarantees issued by Bank Melli.319 
On April 10, 1981, the district court held that Itek was entitled to a preliminary 
injunction preventing the FNBB from honoring any demand under the letters of 
credit.320 On May 25, 1982, the same court issued its summary judgment opinion that the 
demands for payment under the letters of credit were nonconforming, that the demands 
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were accompanied by fraud in the transaction, that all three letters were without legal 
force and null and void, and that FNBB was permanently enjoined from honoring any 
demand.321 The judgment was entered on June I, 1982. 
Following the district court's opinion, all post judgment motions made by Bank Melli 
and FNBB were denied, resulting in an appeal to the First Circuit by both Bank Melli and 
the FI\BB on August 6, 1982. The decision by the First Circuit was handed down on 
March 29, 1983.322 The appeals court vacated the district court's permanent injunction, 
but allowed reinstatement of the preliminary injunction. 
B. Analysis of the Itek Case 
1. Nonconformity of Demand 
Because this case was argued in the First Circuit, ltek was forced to distinguish its 
case from the Banco EspagnoP23 and Flagship Cruises 324 cases by showing that the demands 
made on the letters of credit did not even substantially conform to their requirements. 
ltek's task was particularly difficult due to amendments on the letter of credit require-
ments, the effects of which were disputed by the parties.32s 
The original conditions of the letters of credit required presentation of: (1) a draft 
accompanied by (2) Bank Melli's signed statement certifying that the amount of the draft 
represented funds they had been required to pay under their corresponding guarantees, 
and (3) a copy of the beneficiary's demand on Bank Melli's guarantee.326 A further 
condition of the letters of credit stated that they were available by Bank Melli's cable 
drawing on the FNBB, duly authenticated, mentioning the letter of credit number and 
stating that Bank Melli was mailing the required signed statement and a copy of the 
beneficiary's demand.327 
Subsequent amendments to the letters of credit deleted the requirement of a draft 
and all references to a copy of the beneficiary's demand.328 Therefore, as both FNBB and 
Itek represented: 
the letters of credit call[ed] for payment upon presentation of either (1) a 
signed statement certifying that the amount demanded represented funds 
which Bank Melli was required to pay to the beneficiary, or (2) a 'cable duly 
authenticated mentioning our letter of credit No ... and stating that you are 
airmailing to us the required signed statement'.329 
FNBB and Itek disputed the correct application of the amended requirements and the 
relationships to the doctrine of substantial compliance.33o 
321 No. 80-58, Slip Opinion 10, 11 (May 25, 1982). 
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In addition, FNBB contended that the district court added the requirement that 
Bank Melli state the amount which it had been required to pay, even though a draft was 
no longer required. The lack of a stated amount, which FNBB alleged was not required, 
was the primary reason for the district court's finding of nonconformity.331 
Though a close reading of the letter of credit requirements and amendments sug-
gests that FNBB might have been correct, a close reading of the March 16 telex still 
creates sufficient confusion so that a bank or an appropriate court could find the demands 
nonconforming. Keeping in mind that the down payment letters of credit were to be 
discounted against invoices, the fact that the amounts of the letters of credit outstanding 
did not conform to the total amount requested should have been sufficient to justify a 
finding of nonconformity.332 Were the bank to pay the total amount requested and then 
later find out that Iran had discounted a million dollars worth of invoices submitted by 
Itek prior to the demand, FNBB could have paid a, million dollars in excess. FNBB would 
have incorrectly based its decision to pay the total amount on the assumption that the 
typographical accounting error was in the letters of credit and not the total amount. It 
would seem a wise move for any bank to demand clarification of a million dollar discrep-
ancy in demands made on discountable letters of credit.333 A paying bank is no more 
required to know the specific amounts of down payment standbys discounted on the 
contract than it is required to look to the underlying contract to determine if the demand 
is legitimate.334 This conclusion supports the arguments made by Itek and adopted by the 
district court: that Bank Melli was required to state the exact amounts it had been 
required to pay.335 None of the parties, however, used the discrepancy in the telex as 
either a basis for an injunction, or as a discrepancy which, nevertheless, substantially 
complied with the terms of the letters of credit.336 
The parties disputed the district court holding that the March 16 telex was noncon-
forming because of Melli's failure to state in the March 16 telex that it was airmailing the 
required signed statement.337 Bank Melli, in its brief to the First Circuit, referred the 
Appeals Court to FNBB's argument in its brief that the March 16 telex was, in fact, 
conforming.338 In addition, Bank Melli argued that its February and March telexes 
requesting extensions on the down payment standbys, or, in the alternative, payment of 
the outstanding amounts, were sufficient to require payment of the standbys.339 In 
support of this assertion, Bank Melli pointed to provisions in the letters of credit which 
state, "If this bank [FNBB] is unwilling to extend the validity of this letter of credit, then 
331 No. 80-58 Slip Opinion at 6 (D. Mass., May 25, 1982). 
332 The March 16 Telex in its entirety stated: 
"Your credits S-14588, S-1455'9, S-14555, our guarantees 293691D, 293701D and 
293661D USLRS 70.753, USLRS 125,000 and USLRS 2.250,000 Beneficiaries have 
written claiming credits amount and we confirm that we have been required to pay 
under our guarantees stop pis therefore credit our Ace with our London Br with US 
DLRS 3.445.753 under teleadvice to us and our HO stop delay interest will accrue at 
12% PA from date of claim until we receive reimbursement." Obviously, the total is one 
million dollars larger than the sum of the amounts quoted. 
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this bank [FNBB] will be committed to remit the amount of this letter of credit without 
further demand on the part of Bank Melli, Iran."34o 
Itek argued that, though this provision is stated accurately, after Bank Melli re-
quested the extensions, FNBB did not refuse to extend but merely telexed Bank Melli 
that Itek considered the underlying contract to be terminated, and that Itek requested 
Bank Melli to withdraw its request for extension.341 Itek alleged that FNBB was merely 
seeking advice as to what to do next under the circumstances.342 Bank Melli responded 
with the March 16 telex which demanded payment based on the claim that it had been 
required to pay under its corresponding guarantees.343 Itek was thus saying that Bank 
Melli could have insisted that FNBB extend the letters of credit, but instead, made a 
nonconforming demand in the form of the March 16 telex which failed to state that Bank 
Melli was mailing to FNBB the required signed statement.344 
FNBB argued that the words of the telex substantially conformed to the letter of 
credit requirements, and that the amendments made "the signed statement [serve] no 
purpose which could not equally well be served by the authenticated telex."345 FNBB 
maintained that the telex supplied the substance of what was required to be in the signed 
statement anyway.346 
Itek, of course, claimed that such an assertion was a long way from substantial 
compliance with the terms of a letter of credit.347 Itek cited a long line of cases which held 
that where documents are missing, the demand is nonconforming. Itek then made the 
leap necessary in standby letters of credit, alleging that, "[i]n logic, the same proposition is 
obviously true when a demand is required to contain several representations, but one is 
omitted. We are not aware of any case holding to the contrary."348 
Following this conclusory assertion, Itek attempted to show that in this case, Banco 
Espagnol349 and Flagship Cruises 350 require a finding of nonconformity. In Banco Espagnol, 
the court found that all the documents required were present, but due to confusion 
created by the bank's customer, the language of the inspection certificate did not match in 
haec verba the language required in the letter of credit.351 Itek suggested that, "[t]he 
court's reasoning cannot be twisted to support a conclusion that the complete failure to 
comply with a plain and clear requirement of a letter of credit constitutes a conforming 
demand."352 
Flagship Cruises held that the statement as given was the "functional equivalent"353 of 
the letter of credit requirement. Itek submitted "that the complete failure to provide the 
340 Id. 
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March 4 telexes were conforming demands is being raised for the first time on appeal and that, 
therefore, Bank Melli is precluded from raising it now. Johnson v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F.2d 890 
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345 Brief for Appellant, First National Bank of Boston, at 56. 
346 Id. 
347 Brief for Appellee at 37. 
348 Brief for Appellee at 38. 
349 385 F.2d 230 (lst Cir. 1967). 
350 509 F.2d 699 (lst Cir. 1978). 
351 385 F.2d at 237. 
352 Brief for Appellee at 39. 
353 569 F.2d at 703. 
1984] LETTERS OF CREDIT 257 
signed statement would have compelled a different result in the Flagship Cruises case and 
compels the conclusion in Itek's case that the March 16 telex was nonconforming."354 
The structural and functional differences between standbys and traditional letters of 
credit create the main flaws in Itek's argument. The weak link in the argument is the leap 
from missing documents required in a letter of credit causing nonconformity, to missing 
representations in the document required in a standby letter of credit creating noncon-
formity. 
Both FNBB and Bank Melli argued that the March 16 telex and the required signed 
statement, dated April 14, 1980, but not received by FNBB until May 27, 1980, amounted 
to a conforming demand for the good performance standby, since it did not expire until 
1981.355 The district court held that the telex and the signed statement were nonconform-
ing because they failed to specify that the amount demanded represented funds that 
Bank Melli had been required to pay.356 It is true, however, as Bank Melli points out, that 
Article 8(e) of the UCP placed on FNBB the obligation to inform Bank Melli of any 
nonconformity in the demand "without delay."357 This FNBB did not do, so Bank Melli 
was correct on this particular claim. 
Thus, had the circuit court ever reached the merits of this case, as to nonconformity 
of documentary demands, they should have concluded, even against their own doctrine 
of substantial compliance, that Bank Melli was not entitled to payment of the down 
payment letters of credit because, (1) it did not state how much it had been required to 
pay under its guarantees to the beneficiary,3S8 (2) its own telex's numbers did not add up 
correctly,3S9 (3) it failed to state that it was mailing the required signed statement,360 and 
(4) that problem was not cured by the arrival of the statement because it did not arrive 
until after the expiration of the down payment letters of credit.361 The only hitch would 
have been that the court could have found that the letters should have been paid the 
instant FNBB notified Bank Melli that no extensions would be made.362 By their terms, 
albeit not very good ones for Itek, the letters of credit required payment without further 
demand should FNBB state that no extensions would be made. 
With respect to nonconformity on the good performance standby, FNBB should 
have notified Bank Melli of any problems with the demand, and there was ample time to 
do so prior to expiration of the credit.363 All this, of course, assumes that Itek's arguments 
regarding fraud and the cancellation of the underlying contract had no merit. 
2. Fraud in the Itek case 
Until Bank Melli made demands on the letters of credit, ltek's claims of fraud based 
on UCC § 5-114, like those of many of the account parties, were purely speculative, and 
merited no more than the notice injunction granted to many banks' customers.364 But 
55. 
354 Brief for Appellee at 40. 
355 Brief for Appellant, Bank Melli at 19, Brief for Appellant, First National Bank of Boston at 
356 No. 80-58 Slip Op. at 8 (D. Mass., May 25, 1982). 
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once the demand was made, the potential for irreparable harm was established, and the 
district court was willing to look at aspects of the underlying contract to determine the 
validity of Itek's claims.36s 
In its arguments based on fraud in the transaction, Itek needed to show the court that 
its allegations were not simply disputes on the contract between itself and the beneficiary 
as to whether or not Iran had the right to demand payment. Itek needed to show that the 
demands on the letters of credit by Iran and the Bank were knowingly fraudulent, to the 
extent that they rose above mere disputes on the contract and tainted the whole transac-
tion with fraud. 366 If the parties had agreed that contract disputes would be litigated in 
United States' courts rather than in Iranian courts as the contract required, Itek's task 
would have been considerably easier. This is because the contract clearly states the 
procedure which had to be followed in the event of force majeure.367 
Though force majeure does not usually include a right to be invoked if an export 
license is cancelled, the parties in this case specifically agreed that if the export license for 
the goods produced were cancelled, Itek would be required to inform the other parties 
and make plans to consult and exchange views as to what to do about the problem.368 The 
contract continued to require that "if within three (3) months from the date of requesting 
for negotiations by either party, a mutually agreeable solution is not found, each party can 
on his opinion, cancel the Contract by giving written notice to the other party."369 
In August 1979, after the U.S. government had voided the application for renewal of 
the export license, a representative from Itek went to Iran and presented the officials 
there with all outstanding invoices with the intention of "dearing the accounts."370 In 
November, Itek again was refused renewal of the export license.371 In December, Itek 
informed Iran again of cancellation of the contract due to force majeure as defined in the 
contract.372 
The contract further provided for the release of the down payment standbys within 
four weeks after the clearance of the downpayment amounts.373 It also stated that in the 
event the contracts were cancelled due to force majeure, all good performance guarantees 
should be released immediately.374 On March 7, 1980, having followed the contract 
provisions to the letter, Itek sent notice formally cancelling the contract.37S Bank Melli 
responded by making a demand on the letters of credit, claiming that it had been 
required to pay on its corresponding guarantees.376 
Noting that the UCC does not define fraud in the transaction and emphasizing that 
the flexible standard should be applied, Itek alleged that the call on the letters of credit 
fell squarely within the ambit of the court's decision in the Dynamics case.377 Itek believed 
that Iran was trying to take unconscientious advantage of the demand requirements and 
365 No. 80-58 Slip Op. at 8 (D. Mass., May 25, 1982). 
366 Brief for Appellee at 30. 
367 See Brief for Appellee at 10-12. 
368 Brief for Appellee at 24. 
369 [d. 




374 Brief for Appellee at 26. 
375 [d. 
376 [d. 
377 Brief for Appellee at 28. 
1984] LETTERS OF CREDIT 259 
abscond with Itek's money on a pro forma declaration which had absolutely no basis in 
fact. 378 
Though FNBB did not rebut Itek's fraud arguments, Bank Melli asserted that, not 
only was there no fraud, but that the facts Itek asserted in support of its contention of 
fraud were nothing more than potential defenses to a suit for breach of contract against 
Itek for its failure to deliver the goods. Bank Melli argued that the issues must be resolved 
in contract litigation between Itek and the Ministry of Defense.379 Bank Melli even went 
so far as to suggest that the fraud may have been on Itek's part alleging intentional failure 
to ship any goods, intentional repudiation with evil intent, and deliberate abandonment 
and destruction of the underlying contract (phrases drawn from letter of credit cases). 380 
Bank Melli hotly contested Itek's and the district court's conclusions that the export 
license was ever cancelled.38 ! The Bank asserted that the export license was merely 
suspended, a term which Bank Melli said has a temporary connotation.382 Bank Melli 
pointed to the relevant regulations which provide that the State Department may only 
deny, revoke, or suspend an export license.383 Itek, on the other hand, asserted that the 
cancellation argument was being raised for the first time on appeal and should not be 
considered by the circuit court because it was not raised below.384 Itek also noted that, in 
any event, the necessary renewal application for export was voided, and the U.S. govern-
ment refused to grant a continuation of the license, thus making it impossible to ship the 
goods no matter how Bank Melli might interpret the force majeure provisions of the 
contract. 385 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument advanced by Bank Melli was that, by request-
ing only extensions, or in the alternative, payment if extensions were denied, the Ministry 
of Defense was acting: 
in a commercially reasonable manner, befitting a party concerned about Itek's 
failure to ship but willing to give Itek more time so long as Itek agreed to keep 
its security in place until it had completed performance. This was precisely 
what the contract and letters of credit t4emselves envisioned. The FNBB 
letters required FNBB to either extend or pay; there was no third alternative. 
Itek bargained over and agreed to these terms; it cannot now evade them.386 
In further asserting the lack of fraud on Iran's part, Bank Melli incorrectly con-
cluded that "fraud in the transaction" was a doctrine first developed in Sztejn, and then 
asserted that "anything short of Sztejn-like chicanery is not "fraud in the transaction."387 
Because Sztejn does not stand for the doctrine of "fraud in the transaction," but instead 
established that forged or fraudulent documents may justify an injunction,388 Bank 
Melli's reasoning is incorrect. This is true despite the American Bell decision in which the 
court denied a preliminary injunction with reasoning similar to the above, holding that 
378 ld. 
379 Brief for Appellant, Bank Melli at 20. 
380 Brief for Appellant, Bank Melli at 29. 
381 Brief for Appellant, Bank Melli at 22. 
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the "plaintiff is still far from demonstrating the kind of evil intent necessary to support a 
claim of fraud."389 
The difficulty faced by the courts is to decide where to let the axe fall in close cases 
such as this, where the availability of facts is limited and case precedents appear to 
support either side. The dividing line in this case is clearly the difference between the 
contract disputes, and fraudulently calling on the standbys. Because the allegations of 
fraud are so connected to the provisions ofthe contract on force majeure, the court faced 
what appears to be an irreconcilable dilemma.39o But as suggested in Part II, if the circuit 
court had found that the disputes were on the contract, then Itek's only recourse would 
have been in the Iranian court system where the tribunals are likely to be less than 
sympathetic to the grievances of an American company against the government of Iran. 
As a final consideration in this force majeure, fraud discussion, it should be noted 
that the force majeure provision's were so specifically and uniquely worded that they 
showed the intent of, and the procedures to be used by the original parties to the contract 
should the export license get cancelled; this occurred long before any of the political 
developments in Iran.391 It should naturally follow that a court would seriously consider 
the parties' obligations in such a situation in order to determine who had adhered most 
closely to the contract requirements, and who perhaps had disregarded them in an 
illegitimate, if not fraudulent attempt to grab a few million dollars.392 Though the courts 
may not adjudicate disputes on the contract,393 they do have an equitable power to 
determine if there has, in fact, been fraud.394 Bank Melli seemed to argue the case as if 
the standbys represented liquidated damages in the event of cancellation or in the 
likelihood that the goods never arrived. In fact, Bank Melli framed its arguments around 
the assertion that Itek was able to keep all the goods and sought, in addition to the 
$11,000,000 already paid, another $9,200,000 which represented the work completed but 
not delivered, and cancellation of all standby letters of credit, i::1cluding its good perfor-
mance guarantee.395 Though the government of Iran certainly seemed to have had the 
bargaining power to insist on liquidated damages standbys when it made the deal, the 
contract contains no such provision. Any allegations to the contrary are illusory attempts 
to justify payments on the standbys. 
3. Holder in Due Course Status and the Relationships Between Iranian 
Government Entities 
Both the Cambridge396 and Banco Espagnol397 cases held that where the defense of 
fraud is established, the burden shifts to the bank to prove that it was a holder in due 
388 See note 172 and accompanying text. 
389 474 F. Supp. at 425. 
390 One particular difficulty with the Itek case is the lack of facts. That the District Court could 
decide there had been fraud in the transaction based only on allegations and evidence submitted by 
Itek, even though it was Bank Melli's own fault for not alleging its own set of facts, takes some of the 
punch out of the court's conclusion. 
391 Brief for Appellee at 31. 
392 No. 80-58 slip op. at 8, 9 (D. Mass., May 25, 1982). 
393 [d. 
394 [d. 
395 Brief for Appellant Bank Melli at 10. 
396 41 N.Y.2d 254, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 360 N.E.2d 943 (1976). 
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course - one which had taken the drafts or demands for value, in good faith, and without 
notice of expiration or any other defenses or claims.39B 
Bank Melli placed itself in a difficult position by presenting no proof that it was 
entitled to holder in due course status in its arguments to the district court.399 As Itek 
pointed out in its First Circuit brief, Bank Melli received the telex from FNBB advising it 
that Itek believed that underlying contract to be terminated, and that a court had 
restricted payment. Bank Melli was therefore on notice of Itek's claims and defenses, 
including notice of fraud. 
The district court found additionally that Bank Melli made "no showing, nor offered 
any evidence to show that it had no notice of the underlying fraud and that it paid 
value."40o The court concluded, as did several others in Iranian cases, that it was "fanciful, 
unrealistic, and unnecessary"401 to treat the bank and the government of Iran as separate 
and independent entities. 
Rather than asserting that it was a holder in due course as required by both Banco 
EspalJf!ol402 and Cambridge,403 Bank Melli asserted that it could not not be a holder in due 
course, a claim which does not go far enough to meet the burden of proof shifted to Bank 
Melli by the holdings of the above cases. It is true that a double negative in both 
mathematics and plain English creates a positive; however, on this particular point in 
letter of credit law it creates a grey area in which the burden remains on the claimant to 
prove his assertion. 
4. Indispensable Parties 
As noted earlier in Part II.B.2.h., in most of the Iranian cases, the party who was most 
likely to perpetrate the fraud, the beneficiary sovereign agency, was seldom, if ever, a 
party to the suits for injunctions.404 Bank Melli, under Rule 19(a) of the FRCP,405 
attempted to convince the court that the Ministry of Defense should have been joined as 
an indispensable party to the case because a decision going against Bank Melli would 
subject it to a substantial risk of inconsistent obligations.406 Though Bank Melli did not 
specify what the inconsistent obligations might be, Itek suggested that it was probably 
Bank Melli's concern that it may never be reimbursed for payments made on its guaran-
tees.407 Citing several cases, Itek maintained that this is not sufficient.40B It stated that the 
inconsistent obligations occur where the party might be subject to two judgments with 
which the party cannot comply.409 Bank Melli also argued that without the Ministry of 
Defense as a party, Bank Melli could not fairly defend itself against Itek. Any judgment 
enjoining FNBB from making payment to Bank Melli relied on a finding that the Ministry 
of Defense had committed fraud.41o 
398 41 N.Y.2d at 262, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 272, 360 N.E.2d at 950. 
399 No. 80-58 Slip op. at 9 (D. Mass., May 25, 1982). 
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The district court rejected Bank Melli's contention that the Ministry of Defense was 
an indispensable party, and cited to the KMW 411 case for the proposition that cases 
involving letter of credit litigation do not require that all parties to the underlying 
contract be joined. The court also recognized the unity of the Islamic Republic, its banks, 
and its agencies, and chose to view them as one.412 
Perhaps most importantly, Itek noted that the Ministry of Defense's ability to protect 
any interests it may have had were not impeded. Unless Bank Melli's demand was 
fraudulent, it had already paid on its guarantees to the Ministry.413 Additionally, because 
the Ministry was not a party, the judgment would not bind it in any other litigation.414 It 
would have been very surprising if the First Circuit held differently on appeal. The 
Ministry allegedly had been paid and no judgment in a U.S. court would change that fact. 
Whether the Ministry of War ~ as an indispensable party to the case was the only issue 
relevent to letter of credit cases on which the First Circuit issued a ruling. The court held 
that the Ministry of War was not an indispensable party. It also reasoned that, "[e)ven if, 
as Bank Melli claims, Bank Melli and the Ministry of War are separate and independent 
entities, a judgment m this case will not prejudice Bank Melli's efforts to obtain reim-
bursement from the Ministry of War for funds paid on the letters of credit, nor will the 
Ministry of War be bound by ajudgment in this case on the merits of the 'fraud' issue."415 
IV. METHODS FOR ADAPTING LETTERS OF CREDIT TO THEIR PROPOSED USES 
There are many lessons to be learned from the cases discussed in this article. This 
part adopts a somewhat unusual approach for bringing letters of credit in line with the 
laws governing them. Most commentators agree that standby letters of credit are different 
in both function and form from traditional letters of credit.416 Although most agree that 
changes are needed, either by adapting the letters and their new uses to the law, or 
changing the law to reflect the new uses, few commentators are in complete agreement as 
to what should be done. 
At one time, letters of credit were simply letters issued by a bank at the request of one 
of the bank's good customers for the benefit of someone else, which allowed the ben-
eficiary to draw up to the stipulated amount on his demand. As their commercial use 
expanded, the documentary standard was introduced creating a check on the ben-
eficiary's power to demand the money; he needed first to have the required documents 
in order to make a legitimate demand for the money held for his benefit. As international 
commercial activity grew to major proportions, the transactions became more compli-
cated. Though the basic relationships between the principal parties to a letter of credit 
remain the same - customer, issuer, beneficiary - the number of potential parties to a 
letter of credit has greatly expanded. 
In the banking system, there are now obligor banks - the issuing banks and 
confirming banks, and neutral party banks - advising banks, paying banks, negotiating 
banks, and cones ponding banks. 417 Parties to the underlying contract and the letters of 
411 606 F.2d 10. 
412 No. 80-58 Slip op. at 4 (D. Mass., May 25, 1982). 
413 Brief for Appellee at 56. 
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415 No. 82-1631 Slip op. at 25 (1st Cir., March 29, 1983). 
416 See generally articles cited, n. 220 supra; Note, Guaranty Letters oj Credit: Problems and Pos-
sibilities [hereinafter cited as Problems and Possibilities], 16 ARIZ. L. REv. 822 (1974), Harfield, Code, 
Customs and Conscience in Letter-oj-Credit Law, 4 U.C.C.L.]. 7 (1971). 
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credit can include the bank's customer, a trustee in bankruptcy, the other party to the 
contract, the beneficiary, who may be nothing more than the entity with the right to 
payment under the letters of credit, and the third party issuer of documents required by 
the letter of credit.418 The confusion, problems, and occasional injustices which can result 
from so many different parties to a contract involving letters of credit should be apparent 
from the cases discussed in this article. Many commentators in the wake of the Iranian 
cases have advocated legislation or judicially created doctrines which would recognize the 
different types of letters of credit.419 
This article argues that the power to adapt the new uses of letters of credit to the 
controlling law is in the hands of the principal parties to the letter of credit - the bank, 
the bank's customer, and the contracting party-beneficiary. Not only is this a simpler and 
more flexible approach to letters of credit than legislation or judicially created doctrines, 
it is allowed under both the VCC and VCP. A basic reading of Article 5 of the VCC 
reveals that phrase, "[u]nless otherwise agreed" no less than fifteen times within the 
Code's provisions.42o Additionally, the Code in general adheres to the principles of 
freedom of contract allowing the parties to bargain for their individual interests.421 
Though the. VCP discourages excessive detail in letter of credit contracts in order to 
guard against confusion,422 it does advocate clear instructions on the terms of the letters 
so that the parties' intentions are clear, and the documentary standard applicable.423 
This is not to say that the use of letters of credit should continue unchanged. On the 
contrary this Part argues that the banks have the power to tighten up standards for letters 
of credit to protect themselves and their clients. This is well worthWhile since the banks 
are now exposed to more flexible standards for fraud and shifted burdens of proof for 
holder in due course status, thus subjecting them to greater risks of litigation despite the 
banks being the most innocent party to the whole transaction. The remainder of this 
article will recommend measures which the banks should take when issuing letters of 
credit. Such recommendations will take into account the use to which a letter of credit is 
put and reflect the risks undertaken by the parties to it. It is, after all, the banks who deal 
in these types of transactions as part of their business.424 The banks' position not only 
suggests that the banks should advise their clients on proper form for a particular type of 
letter of credit, but also empowers them to raise elemental standards in order to protect 
their own business interests. In three separate sections, this Part will recommend, first, 
procedures banks should take to protect their own business interests and to bring all types 
of letters of credit into line with applicable law, second, terms a bank should suggest to its 
customer, and third, terms a bank or a lawyer can recommend to a client who is a 
beneficiary under a letter of credit. 
A. For the Banks 
Industry practice has been to require few documents in letters of credit, especially 
when standbys are involved. The courts have therefore been required to stretch the 
documentary standard so that it can be applied to cases involving standbys in which no 
418 See generally, cases cited and discussed in this article. 
419 See note 220, supra. 
420 VCC supra note 8 at Article 5, Letters of Credit. See also Problems and Possibilitities, supra n. 
416 at p. 834, n. 77. 
421 Cf: V.C.C. § 5-102, Comment 2, VCC 1-102 supra note 8. 
422 See VCP supra note 8 at General Provision (d). 
423 See VCP supra note 8 at General Provision (b). 
424 But see VCC § 5-102(1)(b), sup!a note 8. 
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third party documents are required, or where the beneficiary itself issues the documen-
tary demand requiring payment.425 
For their own protection banks should require a minimum amount of documents or 
specific types of documents which would be adequate to determine whether a proper 
demand has been made.426 For example, for a good performance standby, the bank could 
require that there be specific facts alleged in particular documents which demonstrate 
nonperformance. Such a bank-mandated requirement is particularly recommended 
when standbys are involved because, with no collateral involved, the risks are far greater 
and the possibility of recoupment for improper payment less likely. Clearly, this is safer 
for everybody; such a requirement acts only to make it more difficult for a beneficiary to 
make a fraudulent demand. 
An issuing bank should insist on specific wording of demands, and always require a 
draft stating the specific amount to be drawn under a letter of credit.427 This would not 
only help to insure that it is the correct party making the demand, but would also tend to 
avoid problems created by parties using vague local terms, lacking in specificity and easily 
discernible meaning. For example, banks, by requiring specific wording, would not need 
to determine the actual meaning of a phrase such as, "We anticipate that you will pay this 
demand." Though one cannot be sure of its meaning, the phrase means something much 
less than, "We require payment immediately." 
Specific facts or occurrences should be noted in standbys. This would enable a bank's 
customer to gather proof that such a fact does not exist or that such an event has not 
occurred to justify payment.428 They would also give the beneficiary the security of 
knowing exactly what would justify payment. If the obligations and rights of the parties to 
a letter of credit are explicitly stated, confusion and misunderstanding would be substan-
tially reduced, resulting in less litigation and expenses for all parties. The main point here 
is not to reduce the abilities of the customer and beneficiary to bargain for and amend 
terms of a letter of credit, but to ensure that a minimum number of requirements would 
be present in a particular type of letter of credit. These requirements would reflect the 
purpose for which the letter was issued. The primary purpose behind the minimum 
requirements is to ensure that the banks will avoid losses which would benefit the 
beneficiary, or possibly the bank's customer, who is responsible for having the letter of 
credit issued in the first place. 
Further protection against an issuing bank suffering any loss as a result of a court 
injunction against reimbursement would be a requirement of indemnification from a 
bank's customer in any circumstance short of bank fraud.429 If a confirming bank is 
involved, it should also try to get indemnification from the issuing bank's customer so that 
if the issuing bank refused to reimburse a confirming bank which had paid, the customer 
425 See notes 325-363 and accompanying text. 
426 With the many uses for letters of credit, the documents will vary; but as a use is suggested, it 
would take little time to make a preliminary investigation and find an appropriate document or 
develop one for a particular use. 
427 To require a draft seems so elementary in a letter of credit transaction; banks should never 
allow customers to amend a letter of credit so that one is not required. It is a document for the bank, 
not the customer, and should not be considered a bargaining chip at all. 
428 Vnder both the vep and vee, the bank's customer will have a minimal amount of time to 
gather facts which will be sufficient to justify an injunction. Thus, the more clearly the situation 
which will justify payment is expressed, the easier it will be to gather proof. 
429 See vee § 5-109. 
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would still be liable for payment if, for example, the documents did not conform.43o Ifthe 
documents did not conform, the issuing bank's customer would have to show fraud prior 
to the confirming bank accepting the documentary demand and making payment under 
the letter of credit or guarantee. In turn, for the protection of the bank's customer, any 
such indemnification clause should require notice to the customer of receipt of conform-
ing demands, and allow a three-day grace period. This three-day grace period is similar to 
the notice injunctions granted in some of the Iranian cases, and allows the customer to 
gather enough proof showing that the demand was fraudulent. 431 The law is not clear on 
the obligations and rights of the parties if a customer attempts to enjoin the bank after it 
has accepted the documents, but before it has paid. 
These recommendations merely reflect the need for banks to accommodate their 
practices to the new uses of letters of credit in order to protect themselves and their 
clients. Because United States legislation and any judicially constructed doctrine would 
not affect any foreign banks unless they subjected themselves to jurisdiction, it makes 
more sense to place on the banks the obligation to set higher standards in certain types of 
letters of credit. Major change is not recommended, but important adjustments are 
needed so that the letter of credit mechanism can survive and adapt as new situations and 
uses mandate. 
B. For the Bank's Customer 
Because the bank issues letters of credit, the bank is the party which should be the 
best informed about options on terms of letters of credit which will benefit its client. In 
most cases, the following recommendations benefit the bank as well as the customer 
because they clarify the rights and obligations of all the parties, making it easier for the 
bank to perform its obligations with efficiency and confidence. 
I. Third Party Issuers of Documents 
In any type of letter of credit transaction, the presence of a third party, which would 
also issue documents required by the terms of a credit, helps to protect the customer 
against arbitrary or fraudulent demands by the beneficiary.432 Though not a new idea in 
the area of traditional letters of credit, third parties are seldom if ever used in standby 
letter of credit transactions, which by their nature, subject the customer to greater risks. 
In a letter of credit transaction involving a sovereign beneficiary, the third party issuer of 
documents creates a buffer zone which makes it more difficult for the beneficiary to make 
an arbitrary demand. If it can also be shown that the third party was involved in a fraud 
with a sovereign beneficiary, the customer would have a non-sovereign defendant to sue 
for damages. This avoids the difficulty of subjecting a foreign sovereign to the jurisdiction 
of a domestic court.433 
430 uee § 5-107 suggests that the confirming bank acquires the rights to the issuing bank 
anyway. There is no provision against a confirming bank requiring indemnification from the 
customer. 
431 See uee § 5-112 (allows bank to withhold honor of a demand for three banking days), supra 
note 8. 
432 Problems and Possibilities, supra note 416 at 847, Remedies of the Account Party, supra, note 220 
at 379, Reflections Ajier Iran, supra, note 220 at 500. 
433 Remedies of the Account Party, supra, note 220 at 379. 
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2. Strict Construction Clauses 
To avoid different judicial decisions on the compliance of documentary demands 
with the terms of a letter of credit, the customer should attempt to include a strict 
construction clause in the letter of credit contract.434 Combined with specific terms and 
wording required by the banks,435 such a clause would make it easy for a bank or court to 
determine if a demand was conforming. This eliminates the need to construe past cases to 
determine compliance. 
3. Immediate Deductibility of Downpayment Letters of Credit 
As in ltek where the seller has had standbys issued against down payments by the 
buyer, the customer should attempt to set up the standbys to provide for his own issuing 
of documents in the form of invoices evidencing work completed. If the buyer is con-
cerned about the customer fraudulently issuing invoices the parties could agree to a third 
party certification of the invoices. Such an approach would also help to uphold the 
documentary standard of letters of credit. 
4. Force Majeure Clauses in the Underlying Contract 
Improper calls on letters of credit could be avoided by the use of a well defined force 
majeure clause. Clear procedures should be established regarding the status of an out-
standing letter of credit in the event that force majeure occurred. Though the force 
m~eure clause in the ltek case did not completely protect Itek, it was a major factor in the 
district court's determination that fraud in the transaction had occurred.436 A properly 
worded force majeure clause would greatly help to demonstrate the intentions of the 
parties to the underlying contract and their intentions regarding outstanding letters of 
credit.437 
5. Keeping the Number of Banks Involved to a Minimum 
A bank's customer is always better off when the number of banks involved in a letter 
of credit transaction is kept to a minimum. In the arrangements used in the Iranian cases, 
Bank Melli was in a position to make a conforming demand on the guarantee and collect 
payment from the confirming government bank without the customer in the United 
States even knowing it. In the Iranian cases, the courts often viewed the sovereign 
beneficiary and the government bank as united entities controlled by the Islamic Repub-
lic.438 Nevertheless, the courts may not always make such a finding. In such a case, a 
foreign bank which has honored the credit demand would probably be found to be a 
holder in due course. The issuing bank would then be committed to pay, and the bank's 
customer would have to reimburse the bank. 
434 This will clearly help in any litigation since courts are bound by the agreements of the parties 
regardless of how the court may construe the conformity doctrines. 
435 See notes 23-85 and accompanying text. 
436 No. 80-58 Slip op. at 10 (D. Mass., May 25, 1982). 
437 Even though the Itek contract wj'h Iran appeared to prescribe detailed procedures in the 
event of force majeure, when it came down to the word "cancel" on the export license, the parties 
learned that the State Department only "suspended, revoked, or denied" licenses, thus triggering the 
dispute. See Brief for Appellant, Bank Melli at 23, Brief for Appellee at 30. 
438 No. 80-58 Slip op. at 4 (D. Mass., May 25, 1982). 
1984] LETTERS OF CREDIT 267 
The best arrangement would be to have an American issuing bank in the U.S. with a 
branch in the foreign country of the beneficiary. The branch could either be an advising 
bank, a correspondent bank, or a second-tier guarantor which issues a guarantee. An 
arrangement involving a second-tier guarantor would allow the foreign branch to look to 
elements of the underlying contract to determine the legitimacy of the demand. 439 
Because nonconformity does not apply to holder in due course status (meaning that 
a bank which pays against nonconforming documents is not protected from liability) 
banks also benefit when fewer banks are involved. Thus, both banks and customers 
should work towards this goal. 
6. Maintaining the Proper Sovereign Beneficiary 
The doctrine of state succession allows the sovereign beneficiary to change without 
recourse from the letter of credit doctrine of strict conformity. It is therefore to the 
customer's benefit to have an individual beneficiary named in the letter of credit, as 
opposed to a government or one of its agencies. Additionally, a clause requiring immedi-
ate release of a letter of credit if the government of a country is overthrown by force of 
arms or a coup d'etat would protect a customer against a successor regime which perhaps 
neither likes nor wishes to continue to deal with customers from a particular country, and 
would not mind adding some standby money to its coffers. 
7. Modifying Boiler Plate Letters of Credit 
As noted in the introduction to this section, the UCC Article 5 provisions often begin 
with the phrase, "[u]nless otherwise agreed .... "440 Prior to the Iranian letter of credit 
litigation, it was not uncommon for standby letters of credit to be issued in a standard 
form. Often the only negotiated aspect would be the percentage which the bank's cus-
tomer would pay the issuing bank for the service. As the results of the Iranian cases 
suggest, this should no longer be the only element of a letter of credit negotiated. Those 
who initially drafted the letter of credit statutes may not have realized that the uses of 
letters of credit as a versatile and useful financial instrument would expand so greatly; but 
perhaps as a recognition of the principle of freedom of contract, they made sure that such 
diversification would be possible. It is now up to the banks, the customers and the 
beneficiaries to take advantage of that which has always been available to them. The 
legislature has already acted; and there should be no need for the judiciary to restrict the 
uses of letters of credit. 
C. For the Beneficiary 
The beneficiary's primary interest is to be able to recieve payment upon demand. As 
a result, it must use its bargaining power to keep the customer from including all the 
clauses and ideas recommended above from incorporation into its letter of credit. Every 
one of the recommendations made above, in one way or ariother, makes collecting on a 
demand more difficult. In addition to trying to avoid such clauses, the beneficiary should 
also try to include a few of its own for protection against injunction or non-payment. 
439 Regulation M allows a foreign branch of a U.S. batik to issue a guarantee. See 12 C.F.R. 
§ 213.3(b)(l) (1979). Domestic banks lack statutory authority to act as a surety. Land, The No-Guaranty 
Rule and the Standby Letter of Credit, 96 BANKING L.J. 46 (1979). 
440 UCC Article 5, Letters of Credit, supra note 8. 
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1. Indispensable Party Clauses 
Similar to Bank Melli's argument in Itek, a foreign confirming bank might like to see a 
clause requiring that the beneficiary be made a party to any litigation involving letters of 
credit.441 Such a clause is also advantageous to the beneficiary. Not only would the 
beneficiary be given notice of any and all actions attempting to enjoin payment to him, but 
it would mandate that his side be heard. It would also require that the beneficiary be 
properly served and brought within the jurisdiction of the court. 
2. Liquidated Damage Standbys 
In addition to any good performance standbys the beneficiary can bargain for, he 
should also try to secure a liquidated damages standby. It would be payable on a demand 
showing any kind of termination, non-delivery, cancellation or repudiation of the con-
tract whether or not the action was legitimate. For example, if there had been any 
liquidated damages standbys involved in the Itek case, Iran could have collected on them 
regardless of whether or not force majeure occurred. In another situation, suppose the 
buyer purchased the goods F.O.B., seller's plant. If the buyer's export license were 
cancelled or he was otherwise unable to pick up the goods, a liquidated damages standby 
could protect him.442 
3. Sovereign Beneficiary's Relationship to Its Government Bank 
If a sovereign beneficiary is involved in a letter of credit agreement, it should first try 
to make its government bank a confirming bank which will accept and pay on a conform-
ing demand. Once this is agreed to, the sovereign beneficiary should attempt to include a 
clause in the letter of credit agreement stating that the government bank has no relation 
to the beneficiary which would disallow holder in due course status. As a result, once a 
demand was made, accepted and paid, no injunction could issue for fraud unless it could 
be shown that the bank had perpetrated it. In addition, a customer would be required to 
allege and show fraud on the beneficiary's part prior to demand, acceptance, and pay-
ment.H3 
4. Extendability Clauses 
The beneficiary under a letter of credit has a real interest in the credit not expiring 
before the beneficiary has a legitimate reason to call on it. Therefore, the beneficiary 
should always try to bargain for an extendability clause which, in explicit terms, would 
allow the beneficiary to extend the expiration date of a letter of credit upon demand 
without consent of the customer. Finally, this clause should be worded so that the bank 
must either extend or pay without further demand on the part of the beneficiary.444 
441 Brief for Appellant Bank Melli at 35, No. 80-58 Slip op. at 3 (D. Mass., May 25, 1982), ltek 
Corp. v. First National Bank of Boston No. 82-1631 Slip op. at 24 (1st eir. March 29, 1983) (finding 
the Ministry of War not an indispensable party). 
442 Under uee § 2-718 liquidated damages are allowed in contracts so long as they are 
reasonable in the light of potential harm caused by a breach, difficulties of proof of loss, and the 
inconvenience of obtaining an adequate remedy. uee § 2-718(1) supra note 8. Such requirements 
could be easily shown in a complicated international transaction. 
443 So long as the bank is a holder in due course, this is the law. uee § 5-114(2)(a),supra note 8. 
444 See Brief for Appellant, Bank Melli, at 17, 18. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This article has had a dual purpose. First, it is an introduction to letters of credit, 
their varied uses, and the intricacies of the laws applicable to them. Second, it is a 
recommendation to those who use letters of credit, for whatever purpose, to adapt each 
letter of credit to its proposed use, and to do it according to the applicable law. If this 
means creating an appropriate document in order to adhere to the documentary stan-
dard, then this should be done. The most valuable aspect of a letter of credit is its 
guarantee of payment. The Iranian cases show that this guarantee is jeopardized when 
the documentary standard is abandoned in a standby letter of credit. A properly designed 
letter of credit should always be paid when a non-fraudulent conforming demand has 
been made. If parties to a letter of credit properly negotiate its purpose, and adapt it to 
letter of credit law, they will find that they are all better protected. They will also find that 
the letter of credit will be better protected as the valuable financial instrument it has 
become. 
A. James Casner III 
